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The law of regulated industries, particularly the obligation to secure 'just
and reasonable rates "for regulated services, is a highly specialized application
of financial economics. Ratemaking, bluntly put, represents a regulatory
exercise in capital asset pricing. As a matter of economics, this Essay describes
ratemaking as a variation on thefinancial theme of uncertainty. As a matter of
law, this Essay describes legal principles guiding the regulatory determination
of the rate of return on utility property. It analyzes two valuation methods
derived from the 1923 Bluefield Water Works decision ("attracting capital" and
"comparable earnings"), as well as a third approach based on the capital asset
pricing model. Discretionary elements in rate regulation make it impossible to
wholly alleviate uncertainty in the pricing of infrastructure. Rate regulation
therefore constitutes a speculative undertaking in its own right.
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I. The Greatest Machine Ever Built
In a "world ...... lit by lightning," "time is the longest distance between
two points." As Anthropocene excesses darken humanity's prospects,2
technological innovation strives to keep humans lit, warm, and connected. Law
may not physically prepare the world for climate change, but it can dictate how
low- and zero-carbon electrical infrastructure will be financed. This Essay
analyzes public utility regulation as an application of financial economics.
The electrical grid that illuminates the world deserves nearly every
superlative used to describe it. The electrical power system has been hailed as
the "supreme engineering achievement of the 20th century,"3 the "world's
biggest, most complex machine,"4 and perhaps even "the most complex machine
ever made."5 Electricity can neither "be stored on any significant scale" nor be
directed in the fashion of "classic switched networks." 6 Base load generation
remains necessary because humans demand electricity precisely when solar
1. Robert Bray, Introduction to TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, THE GLASS MENAGERIE 97
(1999).
2. See, e.g., Bruce D. Smith & Melinda A. Zeder, The Onset of the Anthropocene, 4
ANTHROPOCENE 8 (2013); Jan Zalasiewicz et al., Stratigraphy of the Anthropocene, 369 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'YA 1036 (2011); Jan Zalasiewicz, Mark Williams, Will Steffen & Paul Crutzen,
The New World of the Anthropocene, 44 ENVTL. SC. & TECH. 2228 (2010).
3. GEORGE CONSTABLE & BOB SOMERVILLE, A CENTURY OF INNOVATION: TWENTY
ENGINEERING ACHIEVEMENTS THAT TRANSFORMED OUR LIVES 1 (2003); accord, e.g., MASS. INST. OF
TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID 1 (2011); X. Andy Sun, Robust Optimization in Electric Power
Systems, in ADVANCES AND TRENDS IN OPTIMIZATION WITH ENGINEERING APPLICATIONS 3 57-66 (Tamos
Terlaky et al. eds., 2017) (describing the grid as "one of the most complex human-made systems").
4. S. Massoud Amin, Securing the Electricity Grid, 40 BRIDGE 1, 14 (2010).
5. PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE GRID: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE HEART OF OUR
ELECTRIFIED WORLD 1 (2007).





energy, arguably the greatest ecosystem service," is unavailable. By balancing
generation and load "in real time," the "sophisticated systems" that "ensure
continuous delivery of reliable electric service"9 represent "the ultimate 'just-in-
time' manufacturing process, where supply must be produced to meet demand
in real time."'0
The American economy depends on electrical infrastructure," the
operation of "millions of component parts and individual devices . .. in
'electromagnetic unity. '12 Engineering challenges will become more
formidable as climate change forces the electrical system to adopt low- or zero-
carbon sources of generation. The precise "mix of technologies, practices, and
behaviors [that] will deliver substantial decarbonization" remains shrouded in
"significant uncertainty."" Contributions by distributed generation, 4 electrical
storage," nuclear energy,' 6 and carbon capture and storage-7 to name only four
possibilities-elude precise quantification. Even the best established of these
prospects, nuclear energy,19 requires "enormous facilities with high construction
7. See, e.g., CONSERVING AND VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND BIODIVERSITY (K.N.
Ninan ed., 2009); NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C.
Daily ed., 1997); PETER H. RAVEN ET AL., TEAMING WITH LIFE: INVESTING IN SCIENCE TO UNDERSTAND
AND USE AMERICA'S LIVING CAPITAL (1999); Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Economic Returns
from the Biosphere, 391 NATURE 629 (1998); Robert Costanza et al., The Value of Ecosystem Services:
Putting the Issues in Perspective, 25 ECOL. ECON. 67 (1998).
8. See Francesco Meneguzzo, Rosaria Ariminna, Lorenzo Albanese & Mario Pagliaro,
The Great Solar Boom: A Global Perspective into the Far Reaching Impact of an Unexpected Energy
Revolution, 3 ENERGY SC. & ENG'G 499, 506 (2015). See generally Dong Gu Choi, Sang Yong Park,
Nyun-Bae Park & Jong Chul Hong, Is the Concept of "Grid Parity" Defined Appropriately to Evaluate
the Cost-Competitiveness ofRenewable Energy Technologies?, 86 ENERGY POL'Y 718 (2015) (comparing
the cost of generation technologies that differ in their ability to meet base loads).
9. Boyd, supra note 6, at 1626-27.
10. Paul L. Joskow, Creating a Smarter US. Electricity Grid, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 33
(2012); accord Boyd, supra note 6, at 1627 & n.36.
11. See, e.g., Lois R. Lupica, Transition Losses in the Electric Power Market: A Challenge
to the Premises Underlying the Arguments for Compensation, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 649, 652 n.6 (2000).
12. William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy
Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 883 (2016) (quoting Fed. Power Comm'n v. Fla.
Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 460 (1972)).
13. Id. at 887.
14. See Amy L. Stein, Distributed Reliability, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 887 (2016).
15. See Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Legal Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy
Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697 (2014).
16. See Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the
Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 166-68 (2016) (comparing the impact of coal, natural gas, and nuclear
energy).
17. See, e.g., BEREND SMIT, JEFFREY A. REIMER, CURTIS M. OLDENBURG & IAN C.
BOURG, INTRODUCTION TO CARBON CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION (2014); JENNIFER WILCOX, CARBON
CAPTURE (2012); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change, Carbon Sequestration, and
Property Rights, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 363.
18. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 887.
19. See Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, 331 P.U.R.4th 357 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, Aug. 1, 2016) (discussing "zero-emissions nuclear generation resources as a bridge to the clean
energy future" where "50% of New York's electricity is to be generated by renewable sources by 2030 as
part of a strategy to reduce statewide greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2030").
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costs." 20 A future low- or zero-carbon electrical system "will have a higher
capital intensity."2 '
Maintaining the grid, let alone decarbonizing it, poses more than merely
technological obstacles. Ensuring a constant flow of electricity also presents
great challenges to law and finance. "[A]ny electricity that enters the grid
immediately becomes a part of a vast pool of energy that is constantly moving
"22in interstate commerce."2 As public utility law continues its "great
transformation," 23 its "creative force" will compel us "to transform the most
complex machine ever built into something vastly cleaner, more distributed, and
more interactive."24
The law of regulated industries endeavors to lay the foundations of
civilization-or at least to finance the most ambitious forms of infrastructure.
Through Gilded Age legislation addressing industries "affected with a public
interest," 25 the law of regulated industries has built "intricate and pervasive
systems which furnish light, heat, power, water, transportation, and
communication." 26 For an ambitious society seeking to "catch the last subway,
the streetcar, the bus," "[o] ne job is not enough, one life is not enough."27 As
the legal basis of "Infrastructure U.S.A.," public utility law has permitted "a
degree of experimentation in governmental direction of economic activity ...
beyond any historical parallel." 28
This Essay explains the obligation to ensure "just and reasonable"
regulatory rates as a specialized application of financial economics. Ratemaking
represents a legal exercise in capital asset pricing. Part II describes ratemaking
as a variant of financial uncertainty. Part III reviews the law governing the rate
of return on utility property. Part IV analyzes two valuation methods derived
from the Bluefield Water Works decision ("attracting capital" and "comparable
earnings").29 Part V presents a third approach based on the capital asset pricing
model. Part VI concludes that discretionary elements in rate regulation make it
20. Lucas W. Davis, Prospects for Nuclear Power, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 53 (2012); see
also Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 844 ("Fission-based reactors are enormously complicated machines
.... They take years to build and cost huge sums of money.").
21. Boyd, supra note 6, at 1634.
22. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7 (2002).
23. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation ofRegulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998).
24. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 893.
25. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
26. FELix FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 81 (1930); accord Boyd,
supra note 6, at 1638.
27. JOHN DOS PASSOS, U.S.A. 1 (1996).
28. Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., Rate Regulation, in 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 104 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1934); accord William J. Novak,
Law and the Social Control ofAmerican Capitalism, 60 EMORY L.J. 377, 404 (2010).





impossible to wholly alleviate uncertainty in utility pricing. Rate regulation
therefore constitutes a speculative undertaking in its own right.
II. Ratemaking as Regulatory Asset Pricing
A. "Public" Utilities, Private Investors
Rate regulation is properly understood as a branch of public finance. The
law of regulated industries, like taxation, not only "defray[s] the cost of services"
that "the market would not provide in the desired quantity and at the desired
price," but also "transfer[s] money" between groups.30 Differences between
"public ownership" and "profit-seeking management" have predictable,
systematic "effect[s] ...... on the price behavior of government firms." 3' Public
intervention in energy, transportation, and communications markets should be
treated as instances of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. 32 Capital structure-
implemented through debt, preferred stock, and common stock33 -iS merely a
theoretical abstraction that arranges the order of claims against a firm without
affecting fundamental valuation.34
In the United States, most "networks that distribute products or services
over geographic space" are owned by private investors and operated for profit.35
Investor-owned utilities comprise three-quarters of America's trillion-dollar
electrical power system. 36 Extensive private ownership converts the term "public
utility" into an egregious misnomer. Utilities are "public" in the pragmatic sense
that they satisfy mass needs, like "traditional governmental functions of police
and justice," and do not become "less so when these services are rendered by
private enterprise."37
From a global perspective, it is "striking that the United States was the only
country that was able to maintain private ownership of most of its utilities
30. Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 22, 28-29
(1971); cf Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector ofInternal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (describing taxes as the price "we pay for civilized society").
31. Sam Peltzman, Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises: Electric Utilities in the
United States, 14 J.L. & ECON. 109, 111 (1971).
32. See Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance, and
the Theory ofInvestment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
33. See N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. FERC, 42 F.3d 659, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (identifying the
contribution of long-term debt, preferred stock, and common stock to a pipeline's capital structure).
34. See John C. Cox & Stephen A. Ross, The Valuation of Options for Alternative
Stochastic Processes, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 145, 145 (1976) (describing debt and equity as "simply financial tools
... offering alternative modes of ownership of the same economic stream of returns").
35. Jost A. G6MEZ-IBAFIEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS,
AND DISCRETION 4 (2003).
36. See RON BING ET AL., PRACTICING RISK-AwARE ELECTRICITY REGULATION: WHAT
EVERY STATE REGULATOR NEEDS TO KNOw 14 (2012) (reporting $765 billion in investor-owned utilities,
$200 billion in municipal utilities, and $112 billion in rural electric cooperatives).
37. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 625 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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throughout the twentieth century." 38  Other countries typically commit
infrastructure to the public sector. As countries grow, utilities often draw hostile
attention as "the first nationally prominent big businesses to emerge" from an
industrial revolution.39 The United States has eluded these political dynamics.
True to an "energetic and articulate" culture that champions capitalism over
socialism with "remarkable" intensity,40 America embraces private ownership of
infrastructure.
A mostly private electrical power system may struggle to replace climate-
altering fuels. As commentators have noted, to "limit[] the anthropogenic
increase in global mean surface temperature to less than 2 degrees Celsius," the
United States must reduce its greenhouse gas "emissions 80% below 1990 levels
by 2050."41 "[C]urrent wholesale power markets . . . appear limited in their
ability to support investments in large, capital-intensive, low-carbon generation
facilities such as nuclear or coal plants with carbon capture and storage."42 The
transition "to an 80 percent renewables future will require investing roughly $50-
70 billion per year over the next decade," perhaps "between $100 and $200
billion per year as we approach 2050."43 Low-carbon conversion will demand
sums "roughly two to five times larger than current levels of investment in new
transmission and generation assets."44
The "higher capital intensity of a low-carbon electricity system," relative
to "the current fossil-based system," compounds the risk inherent in "the long-
lived nature of many of these assets."45 Even more than economies of scale4 6 or
scope,47 the asset-specificity of "durable and immobile investments" is "the
defining characteristic[] of infrastructure monopolies." 48 Whether limited by
geography, time, or embedded human capital, investments sunk into assets
specific to one transaction can be neither recovered nor transferred.4 9 Scale,
38. G6MEZ-IBkEZ, supra note 35, at 2.
39. Id at 190.
40. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE ART OF CONTROVERSY 35 (1955).
41. JAMES H. WILLIAMS, BENJAMIN HALEY, FREDRICH KAHRL & JACK MOORE,
PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014).
42. Boyd, supra note 6, at 1689.
43. Todd Foley et al., Finance Policy: Removing Investment Barriers and Managing Risk,
26 ELEC. J. 54, 55 (2013).
44. Id
45. Boyd, supra note 6, at 1692.
46. See, e.g., Adam Plaiss, From Natural Monopoly to Public Utility: Technological
Determinism and the Political Economy oflnfrastructure in Progressive-Era America, 57 TECH. & CULTURE
806 (2016); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969); Richard
Schmalensee, A Note on Economies of Scale and Natural Monopoly in the Distribution of Public Utility
Services, 9 RAND J. ECON. 270 (1978).
47. See Gary C. Biddle & Richard Steinberg, Allocations ofJoint and Common Costs, 3
J. ACCT. LITERATURE 1 (1984); John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies ofScope, 71 AM. ECON. REV.
208 (198 1); David J. Teece, Economies ofScope and the Scope ofthe Enterprise, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
223 (1980).
48. G6MEZ-IBAEZ, supra note 35, at 9 (emphasis in original).
49. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN




durability, and specialization all exacerbate the vulnerability of infrastructure to
opportunism by suppliers, customers, competitors, and the government. 0
Extensive historical investments in infrastructure represent sunk costs in a
technologically dynamic marketplace responding exclusively to current costs.5 '
Economic theory prescribes a crisp response to sunk costs: Ignore them. Though
sunk costs "are usually visible,... they should always be ignored when making
economic decisions."52 Economists evaluate cost on a wholly prospective
basis;53 costs already incurred "do not affect decisions on price and quantity." 54
Heavy reliance on technological innovation in industries such as broadband
communications and the post-carbon electrical system55 demands a focus on
"forward-looking costs" to the exclusion of "historical, booked costs" allegedly
stranded by economic, technological, or regulatory change.56 Whatever their
legality,57  legislative and administrative efforts to recover "stranded"
investments are the economic "antithesis of competition. "58
But today's forward-looking investments are tomorrow's sunk costs. 59 The
prospect that infrastructure may be stranded by technological or political change
affects the marginal propensity to invest. One prime example is the prospect that
keeping the anthropocentric contribution to global temperatures below 2'C will
"eliminat[e] virtually all natural gas use by 2050."60 The theory of contestable
markets, a description covering vast turf between perfect competition and natural
CAPITALISM: FIRMS,MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1996); Paul L. Joskow,Assset-Specificity and
the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95 (1988); Oliver E.
Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983);
Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction CostApproach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548
(1981).
50. See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298-300 (1978).
51. Alenco Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2000).
52. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS § 7.2, at 221 (9th
ed. 2017). But cf R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON.
STUD. 165, 167 (1956) (raising "the possibility that a person is not indifferent to his consumption history but
enjoys his memories of it").
53. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 499 n.17 (2002).
54. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1, at 7 (3d ed. 1986).
55. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1117 (7th Cir.
1983).
56. Alenco Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2000).
57. Compare William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded Costs, 18 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 835 (1995) (favoring stranded cost recovery), with Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded
Costs andDecarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 645 (2017) (urging a tempered approach).
58. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 28 F.3d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
59. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Technological Change, Sunk Costs, and Competition, 3
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 883 (1987).
60. STEVE WEISSMAN, CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, NATURAL GAS AS A BRIDGE
FUEL: MEASURING THE BRIDGE 8 (2016); accord Hammond & Rossi, supra note 57, at 668; see WILLIAMS,
HALEY, KAHRL & MOORE, supra note 41, at 1 (reporting the 2 0 C limit as a goal).
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monopoly,6' recognizes that sunk costs can impede future entry.62 Because an
"investment that cannot easily be moved elsewhere is an impediment to exit,"
sunk costs pose "a prime obstacle to entry."6 3
"Hit-and-un" entry in contestable markets, where investments are not
irretrievably committed, imposes competitive discipline and relaxes the need for
regulatory intervention.64 Outside structurally contestable industries such as
transportation and mobile telecommunications,65 however, incumbents defend
sunk investments through "sit-and-gun" behavior, including predatory pricing.66
Sunk costs and contestable markets are ideas drawn from microeconomics
and from industrial organization.67 The principle of "costly reversibility"
translates these ideas into corporate finance. Reversals of investment in
physical68 and human6 capital are never free. "Costly reversibility implies that
firms face higher costs in cutting than in expanding capital."70 The reluctance to
build irretrievably sunk infrastructure, to say nothing of private investors'
recalcitrance to invest absent reassurance that they will recover their capital,
represents a special case of costly reversibility.
The decarbonized future therefore requires not only technological but also
legal and financial ingenuity. Investment risk of this magnitude poses financial
61. See, e.g., William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of
Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1982); Robert D. Cairns & Dhanayshar Mahabir, Contestability:
A Revisionist View, 55 ECONOMICA 269 (1988); Avinash Dixit, Recent Developments in Oligopoly Theory,
72 AM. ECON. REV. 12 (1982); William G. Shepherd, "Contestability " vs. Competition, 74 AM. ECON. REV.
572 (1984); Michael Spence, Contestable Markets and The Theory ofIndustry Structure: A Review Article,
20 J. ECON. LIT. 981 (1983).
62. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 290-92 (1982).
63. Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory ofContestable
Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111, 123-24 (1984).
64. See id. at 114-15, 121-22. See generally Elizabeth E. Bailey, Contestability and the
Design ofRegulatory and Antitrust Policy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 179 (1981) (extending this idea to antitrust
as well as the formal regulation of entry and rates).
65. See Bailey & Baumol, supra note 63, at 123-36; Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Panzar,
The Contestability ofAirline Markets During the Transition to Deregulation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
128 (1981); William B. Tye, The Applicability of the Theory of Contestable Markets to Rail/Water Carrier
Mergers, LOGISTICS & TRANsP. REV., March 1985, at 57.
66. See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition ofPredation:
Pricing andProductInnovation,91 YALE L.J. 8(1981); William G. Shepherd,Entry Barriers, Contestability,
and Predatory Pricing, 46 REVUE D'ECONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 1 (1988).
67. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDERUNCERTAINTY
(1994); Andrew B. Abel, Optimal Investment Under Uncertainty, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 228-233 (1983)
Andrew B. Abel & Janice C. Eberly, A Unified Model ofInvestment Under Uncertainty, 84 AM. ECON.
REV. 1369-1384 (1994); Andrew B. Abel & Janice C. Eberly, Optimal Investment with Costly
Reversibility, 63 REV. ECON. STUD. 581-593 (1996).
68. See Russell W. Cooper & John C. Haltiwanger, On the Nature of Capital
Adjustment Costs, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 611-633 (2006); Valerie A. Ramsey & Matthew D. Shapiro,
Displaced Capital: A Study ofAerospace Plant Closings, 109 J. POL. ECON. 958-992 (2001).
69. See Stephen J. Nickell, Dynamic Models of Labour Demand, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
LABOR ECONOMICS 473-524, 473-74 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986); F.M. Scherer,
Research and Development Resource Allocation and Rivalry, 81 Q.J. ECON. 359 (1967).




challenges beyond the conventional regulatory toolkit." Takings cases barring
allegedly "confiscatory ratemaking"7 2  can do no more than "prevent
governmental destruction of existing economic values." 73 The confiscatory
ratemaking concept "cannot be applied to insure values, or to restore values that
have been lost by the operation of economic forces." 74 Absent some mechanism
for "socializ[ing] the costs of . . . investments" in low-carbon generation,
"whether through rates, subsidies or some combination," private investors "are
unlikely to provide financing on favorable terms."75 Alarmingly, "liberalized
electricity markets" may be incompatible with a low-carbon future.76
To the extent that governments build or own infrastructure, regulatory
pricing principles will also control. Rate regulation governs public and quasi-
public enterprises, such as the Postal Service7 7 and the Bonneville Power
Administration.7 8 Publicly owned elements of tomorrow's zero-carbon electrical
system will surely be priced "with a view to encouraging the widest possible
diversified use of electric power at the lowest possible rates to consumers."79
Within any system of public finance seeking to spur growth, 0 especially one
heeding the "golden rule" that government borrowing should never exceed net
capital formation," balancing private and public investment will prove crucial to
stabilizing rates of return.82
71. See Robert Gross et al., Risks, Revenues, and Investment in Electricity Generation:
Why Policy Needs to Look Beyond Costs, 32 ENERGY ECON. 796 (2010).
72. Conventional wisdom traces the confiscatory ratemaking doctrine, somewhat
misleadingly, to Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). See, e.g., 2 JAMES C. BONRIGHT, VALUATION OF
PROPERTY 1095-96 (1937); John N. Droback, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits
on Utility Rate Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REV. 65, 75-76, 80 n.65 (1985); Robert L. Hale, Does the Ghost of
Smyth v. Ames Still Walk?, 55 HARv. L. REV. 1116, 1120 (1942); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the
Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187,
216-23 (1984).
73. Market St. Ry. v. R.R. Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 567 (1945).
74. Id.
75. Boyd, supra note 6, at 1690.
76. David M. Newberry, Reforming Competitive Electricity Markets to Meet
Environmental Targets, 1 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL. POL'Y 69,71 (2012).
77. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal Serv., 462
U.S. 810 (1983) (assigning to the Postal Rate Commission the primary responsibility for setting postage rates
under the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3622(b) (2018)); Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States,
2 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
78. See 16 U.S.C. § 839e(a)(2) (2018) (setting rates within the Bonneville Power
Administration so "that such rates ... are sufficient to assure repayment of the Federal investment ... over a
reasonable number ofyears [and] ... are based upon the Administrator's total system costs"); cf Cal. Energy
Comm'n v. Bonneville Power Admin., 909 F.2d 1298, 1307-08 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that the BPA
need not "always charge the lowest possible rates").
79. Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 698 F.3d 774, 789 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting
16 U.S.C. § 838g(1) (2018)).
80. See Koishi Futagami et al., Dynamic Analysis of Endogenous Growth Model with
Public Capital, 95 SCAND. J. ECON. 607 (1993).
81. See Fabrizio Balassone & Daniele Franco, Public Investment, the Stability Pact and
the "Golden Rule ", 21 FISCAL STUD. 207 (2000).
82. See Toshiki Tamai, Public Investment, the Rate ofReturn, and Optimal Fiscal Policy
in a Stochastically Growing Economy, 49 J. MACROECON. 1 (2016).
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The 2016 Supreme Court case of Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC8 3
limited states' efforts to promote the construction of generation capacity by
promising rates more generous than those available in the federally regulated
interstate wholesale market.84 Hughes cabined states' freedom to "compel[]
participants in a federally regulated marketplace to transact capacity at prices
other than the price fixed by [that] marketplace."8 5 The Court, however,
conspicuously withheld judgment on other methods for encouraging "new or
clean generation, including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsidies,
construction of state-owned generation facilities, or re-regulation of the energy
sector." 86 Environmental regulation and subsidies would compound the already
difficult task of matching prices for electricity to the cost of generation,
transmission, and distribution."
The balance of Part II will treat the valuation of utility property as a variant
of a pervasive financial problem: investment under uncertainty.
B. A Generalized Model ofFinancial Uncertainty
1. Information Uncertainty
Prices are signals. They communicate pivotal information about cost,
supply, and demand within "the central nervous system of the economy."8 8 The
discovery and dissemination of economic knowledge inform a collective
"wisdom of prices." 89 What is true of prices on utility services is likewise true of
the prices of those companies' shares, from individual trades 90 to market-wide
demand. 9' Even while invalidating state-level efforts to spur construction of
83. 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).
84. See id. at 1299. See generally Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But
How Dead, and What Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 1, 19-20 (2017) (reviewing
options available to states after Hughes).
85. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 255 (3d Cir. 2014).
86. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299; accord id. at 1300 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
("recogniz[ing] the importance ofprotecting the States' ability to ... ensur[e] a sustainable supply ofefficient
and price-effective energy").
87. See Kevin M. Currier, Cost Reduction Incentives in Electricity Markets with
Overlapping Regulations, 29 ELEC. J. 1 (2016); Kevin M. Currier, Incentives for Cost Reduction and Cost
Padding in Electricity Markets with Overlapping "Green" Regulations, 38 UTIL. POL'Y 72 (2016).
88. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225 n.59 (1940).
89. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, Economics and Knowledge, 4 ECONOMICA 33 (1937); F.A.
Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945); Richard Bronk, Hayek on the
Wisdom ofPrices: A Reassessment, 6 ERASMUS J. PHIL. & ECON. 82 (2013); Sanford J. Grossman, Dynamic
Asset Allocation and the Informational Efficiency ofMarkets, 50 J. FIN. 773 (1995)..
90. See, e.g., Michael J. Brennan & Patricia J. Hughes, Stock Prices and the Supply of
Information, 46 J. FIN. 1665 (1991); Joel Hasbrouck, Measuring the Information Content of Stock Trades,
46 J. FIN. 179 (1991); Joel Hasbrouck, The Summary Informativeness of Stock Trades: An Econometric
Analysis, 4 REV. FIN. STUD. 571 (1991).
91. See, e.g., Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price
Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Price, 45 J. BUS. 179, 182 (1972) (describing how




generating capacity, federal courts acknowledge that anticipated electrical sales
revenue drive decisions to build (or retire) plants.92
The valuation of investor-owned utilities therefore demands the proper
setting of utility rates. "[C]apital-intensive" utilities historically supported
regulation so that they could "secure capital on favorable terms" rather than
"rely[ing] ... on long-term debt financing" to "finance new capital investment"
that neither "the equity markets" nor "annual cash flow" would support, at least
absent "guaranteed rates and protected franchises." 93 The price at which utilities
can secure capital assumes greater importance in an industry that anticipates
expensive low- and zero-carbon generation.
Finance is the branch of economics that analyzes the market for capital for
speculative undertakings. 94 An efficient capital market rewards the assumption
of risk with returns.95 The expectation that the equity market's excess return over
a risk-free asset "should vary positively and proportionately to market volatility"
represents the "first law of finance." 96 As the Supreme Court has recognized:
"The less risk, the less right to any unusual returns upon [an] investment[]." 97
Economic theory anticipates the fundamental problem of utility law: finding
ways to "provide sufficient incentives for long-term investments in capacity."98
"[E]very financial model" begins with "the uncertainty facing investors,
and the substance of every financial model involves the impact of uncertainty on
the behavior of investors and, ultimately, on market prices."99 Trouble arises in
the zone of "[t]rue uncertainty," where "risks are not well understood, where the
range of outcomes is potentially very large, and where probabilities cannot be
assigned with confidence."' 0 0 The distinction between quantifiable risk and
wholly unknowable uncertainty, first recognized by Frank Knight and John
Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579 (1986); Aditya Kaul et al., Demand Curves for
Stocks Do Slope Down: New Evidence from an Index Weights Adjustment, 55 J. FIN. 893 (2000).
92. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1293 (2016) ("The capacity
auction serves to identify need for new generation."); PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 248
(3d Cir. 2014) (acknowledging that 15-year rate commitments "encourage[d] power generation companies
... to add a cumulative 2,000 megawatts of capacity").
93. Boyd, supra note 6, at 1642-43.
94. Cf West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 689 (1935) (Stone, J.,
dissenting) (describing utility regulation as a "speculative undertaking" in its own right).
95. See, e.g., EUGENE F. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE 361 (1976); John Y.
Campbell, Understanding Risk and Return, 104 J. POL. ECON. 298 (1996); Eugene F. Fama & James D.
MacBeth, Risk, Return and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests, 81 J. POL. ECON. 607, 624 (1973); Stephen
Ross, The Arbitrage Theory of CapitalAsset Pricing, 13 J. ECON. THEORY 341 (1976).
96. Evan W. Anderson, Eric Ghysels & Jennifer L. Juergens, The Impact ofRisk and
Uncertainty on Expected Returns, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 233, 233 (2009); see also Robert C. Merton, On
Estimating the Expected Return on the Market: An Exploratory Investigation, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 324
(1980) (describing this specification of risk as "a reasonable 'first approximation' theory for equilibrium
expected returns").
97. Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 49 (1909).
98. Boyd, supra note 6, at 1666.
99. JOHN Y. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 3 (1997).
100. Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 906 (2011).
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Maynard Keynes,' helps separate situations where "probabilities are available
to guide choice" from situations where "information is too imprecise to be
summarized by probabilities."1 02
Uncertainty affects all economic activity.1 03 Economic and political
uncertainty suppresses investment. 04 Political uncertainty motivates households
to increase precautionary savings. 0 5 Those savings fuel demand for government
bonds and other safe assets.'06 The vulnerability of developing countries to
political uncertainty profoundly affects investments in infrastructure, 0 7 as
foreign investors' "fear of regulatory capture and opportunism" by the
government reaches its apex.'s Consumers of public services, especially the
most risk-averse,' 09 realize "option value" beyond conventional measures
whenever uncertainty shrouds future demand." 0
Capital markets fear uncertainty from "ambiguity with respect to the
implications of new information for a firm's value.""' Uncertainty exacts a
101. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 19-20 (1921) (distinguishing
"risk" as "a quantity susceptible of measurement" from the "radically distinct" and "non-quantitative"
concept of "uncertainty"); J.M. Keynes, The General Theory ofEmployment, 51 Q.J. ECON. 209, 213-14
(1937) ("About [certain matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability
whatever....").
102. Larry G. Epstein & Tan Wang, Intertemporal Asset Pricing Under Knightian
Uncertainty, 62 ECONOMETRICA 283, 283 (1994); accord Jochen Runde, Clarifying Frank Knight's
Discussion ofthe Meaning ofRisk and Uncertainty, 22 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 539, 539 (1998).
103. See, e.g., Rildiger Bachmann et al., Uncertainty and Economic Activity: Evidence
from Business Survey Data, 5 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECON. 217 (2013); Nicholas Bloom, The Impact of
Uncertainty Shocks, 77 ECONOMETRICA 623 (2009).
104. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Cyclical Investment,
97 Q.J. ECON. 85 (1983); Benjamin Born & Johannes Pfeifer, Policy Risk and the Business Cycle, 68 J.
MONETARY ECON. 68 (2014); Jesus Femndez-Villaverde et al., Fiscal Volatility Shocks and Economic
Activity, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 3352 (2015); Kevin A. Hassett & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Investment with
Uncertain Tax Policy: Does Random Tax Policy Discourage Investment?, 109 ECON. J. 372 (1999); cf
Brandon Julio & Youngsuk Yook, Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles, 67 J. FIN. 45
(2012) (finding that investment levels decline before national elections).
105. See Francesco Giavazzi & Michael McMahon, Policy Uncertainty and Household
Savings, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 517 (2012).
106. See Lubol Pastor & Pietro Veronesi, Political Uncertainty and Risk Premia, 110
J. FIN. ECON. 520 (2013); Lubol Pastor & Pietro Veronesi, Uncertainty About Government Policy and
Stock Prices, 67 J. FIN. 1219 (2012).
107. See, e.g., Babak Eftekhari & Stephen E. Satchell, International Investors'
Exposure to Risk in Emerging Markets, 22 J. FIN. RESEARCH 83 (1999); Campbell R. Harvey & Tadas
Viskanta, Distributional Characteristics of Emerging Market Returns and Asset Allocation, 24:2 J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 102 (Winter 1998); Dani Rodrik, Policy Uncertainty and Private Investment in
Developing Countries, 36 J. DEV. ECON. 229, 230-34 (1991).
108. G6MEZ-IBAREZ, supra note 35, at 86-87.
109. See Charles J. Cicchetti & A. Myrick Freeman III, Option Demand and Consumer
Surplus: Further Comment, 85 Q.J. ECON. 528 (1971).
110. See Burton A. Weisbrod, Collective-Consumption Services of Individual
Consumption Goods, 78 Q.J. ECON. 471 (1964).




steeper toll on the downside.1 2 Economic retrenchment necessarily reduces the
rate at which business activity transmits economic information." 3
"[P]eople prefer to act on known rather than unknown or vague
probabilities."" 4 When informational "quality is difficult to judge, investors
treat signals as ambiguous."" As informational ambiguity amplifies uncertainty
over the probability and magnitude of default outcomes, including the
deadweight cost of bankruptcy, all premiums associated with bearing risk rise
sharply."16
Information uncertainty confounds valuable signals with noise:
Theoretically, an observed signal (s) is characterized as a firm's fundamental
value (v), such as future cash flow or dividend, plus a noise term (e), that is,
s v + e. The variance of this signal measures information uncertainty:
var(s) = var(v) + var(e), where var(v) is a firm's underlying fundamental volatility
and var(e) reflects the quality of information.11 7
This passage describes two formulas:
1. An economic signal (s) is the sum of value (v) and noise (e): s = v + e
2. The variance of that signal is the sum of the variance of value and the variance
of noise. Equivalently, the variance of a signal consists of quantifiable risk plus a
premium attributable to the reliability of information used to quantify risk:
var(s) = var(v) + var(e)
Both formulas find ready expression within rate regulation as an applied
branch of financial economics. s = v + e describes the utility's value as a function
of economic fundamentals, such as anticipated cash flow from utility operations.
var(s) = var(v) + var(e) indicates that variance in earnings comprises both
fundamental variance and an additional premium reflecting uncertainty.
The reaction of investors to uncertainty deeply affects asset prices. "When
agents are unsure of the correct probability laws governing the market return,"
"they demand a higher premium to hold the market portfolio."" 8 The following
equation expresses the relationship between risk and uncertainty':
112. Cf United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 82 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). ("Threat
of loss, not hope of gain, is the essence of economic coercion.").
113. Nicholas Bloom, Fluctuations in Uncertainty, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 153, 162 (2014);
accord PABLO FAJGELBAUM ET AL., UNCERTAINTY TRAPs (2014); Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Laura
Veldkamp, Learning Asymmetries in Real Business Cycles, 53 J. MONETARY ECON. 753 (2006).
114. Epstein & Wang, supra note 102, at 284.
115. Larry G. Epstein & Martin Schneider, Ambiguity, Information Quality, and Asset
Pricing, 43 J. FIN. 197, 197 (2008) (emphasis in original).
116. See Lawrence J. Christiano et al., Risk Shocks, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 27 (2014).
117. Zhang, supra note 111, at 105 n.2
118. Anderson et al., supra note 96, at 234.
119. Id.
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Etrt+l = yVt + OMt
where E designates the expectation operator, re is the excess return of the market
over a risk-free asset, V"is the conditional volatility of the market," M"measures
the amount of uncertainty in the economy," t indexes all variables (and the
expectation operator) over time, and coefficients y and 0 indicate aversion to risk
and uncertainty.1 20 Notably, this formula implies that "both risk and uncertainty
carry a positive premium."121 Etret+1 = yVt + OMt therefore represents a
special case of var(s) = var(v) + var(e).
Bifurcating s = v + e and var(s) = var(v) + var(e) will prove useful in
evaluating economic signals whose underlying variability arises from distinct
sources, one of which is less quantifiable and therefore more uncertain. Utility-
owned infrastructure is rife with uncertainty. New electrical infrastructure
designed to mitigate global climate change illustrates the impact of uncertainty
on utility finance. Uncertainty along nearly every dimension-scientific,
technological, economic, and political would raise the cost of capital for any
private investment. The ability to express and measure distinct sources of risk
and uncertainty, each with its own quantitative traits (including the impossibility
of reliable quantification under current data and methods), will prove useful in
evaluating the impact of rate regulation on utility valuation and access to capital.
2. Risk-Neutrality and Irreversibility
A project as ambitious as electrical de-carbonization also illustrates the
interaction of uncertainty with asset-specificity and sunk costs. Kenneth Arrow's
contributions to the risk-adjusted evaluation of public investments provide a
useful starting point.1 22 Treating public ownership as the legal default sets a
comparably neutral economic baseline. Municipal ownership accounts for one-
fifth of America's trillion-dollar electrical power industry 23 and remains a viable
alternative to private ownership.1 24
120. Id. at 233-34.
121. Id. at 234.
122. See, e.g., RICHARD W. TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A NORMATIVE THEORY 759-71
(2d ed. 2002) (discussing uncertainty and the Arrow-Lind Theorem); Ziemowit Bednarek & Marian
Moszoro, The Arrow-Lind Theorem Revisited: Ownership Concentration and Valuation, 24 APPLIED FIN.
ECON. 357 (2014); Eric Fesselmeyer et al., A Reconsideration of Arrow-Lind: Risk Aversion, Risk Sharing,
and Agent Choice, 6 J. NAT. RESOURCES POL'Y RES. 51 (2014); L.P. Foldes & R.A. Rees, A Note on the
Arrow-Lind Theorem, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 188 (1977).
123. See BING ET AL., supra note 36, at 14.
124. See Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins and Development of Electric Power
Regulation, in THE END OF A NATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC




Because "the risks associated with a public investment are publicly borne,
the total cost of risk-bearing is insignificant."' 25 Spreading "risk among all
taxpayers" renders "negligible" the "costs of risk-bearing." 126 The resulting risk-
adjusted return may be higher than the private-sector equivalent,1 27 more so if
risk aversion among shareholders or managers raises a private firm's cost of risk-
bearing.1 28 According to Arrow's 1970 work with Robert Lind, "the government
should ignore uncertainty in evaluating public investments."129
In terms of uncertainty within the variability of an economic signal,
var(s) = var(v) + var(e), the public sector's unmatched ability to spread risk
reduces risk-bearing cost and any uncertainty associated with that exercise in
risk management to zero. Variability in the signal collapses to variability in
fundamental value: var(s) = var(v). Even more significantly, expected return on
public investment becomes the lone measure of value: s = v.130
Befitting an intellectual era that inspired intertemporal asset pricing' 3' and
sustainability in resource economics, 13 2 Arrow did not ignore intergenerational
differences in "the revealed preference of individuals."' 33 In 1974 work with
Anthony Fisher, Arrow recognized limits on "the evaluation of benefits from
more traditional public investments." 3 4 Risk-neutrality collapses if public
investment "involves some irreversible transformation of the environment
[effecting] a loss in perpetuity . . . and if information about the costs and
benefits" changes future "expected values."135
Arrow and Fisher's exception to risk-neutrality finds strong legal parallels.
The National Environmental Policy Act demands that environmental impact
statements report "any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources."1 36 The Endangered Species Act limits federal agencies' "irreversible
125. Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public
Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 366 (1970).
126. Id at 374-75.
127. See id. at 374; cf Jack Hirshleifer, Investment Decision Under Uncertainty:
Applications of the State-Preference Approach, 80 Q.J. ECON. 262, 270 (1966) (suggesting that expected
investment return, without regard to risk-bearing costs, should provide the benchmark).
128. See Arrow & Lind, supra note 125, at 376.
129. Id at 366.
130. See id. at 374.
131. See, e.g., Robert C. Merton, An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model, 41
ECONOMETRICA 867 (1973).
132. See, e.g., John M. Hartwick, Intergenerational Equity and the Investment of Rents
from Exhaustible Resources, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 472 (1977); Robert M. Solow, The Economics ofResources
or the Resources ofEconomics, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1974).
133. KENNETH J. ARROW & MORDECAI KuRz, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, THE RATE OF
RETURN, AND OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY 12 (1970).
134. Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty,
andIrreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON. 312, 313 (1974).
135. Id at 313-14.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(CXv) (2018); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (requiring consideration
of the "irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources" in an environmental impact statement's
discussion of environmental consequences").
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or irretrievable commitment of resources."1 37 Although Arrow and Fisher
contemplated irreversible events such as "the extinction of a form of life, . . . the
destruction of a unique geomorphological phenomenon," or the introduction of
nonbiodegradable stock pollutants, their observations "about uncertainty,
information, and irreversibility" apply generally, "without reference to
environmental effects."1 38
Arrow and Fisher anticipated "cumulative 'macro' environmental effects,
such as the increasing concentration of carbon dioxide in the global atmosphere,
with its attendant climatic changes."1 39 Pending ecological catastrophe invites
even more aggressive applications of uncertainty. At the most extreme, the
"dismal theorem" undermines all attempts at coherent forecasting. "[T]he
expected loss from [extraordinary] risks such as climate change is infinite."'40
Under such extreme conditions, "standard economic analysis cannot be
applied."141 The "catastrophe-insurance aspect of ... a fat-tailed unlimited
exposure-situation ... can dominate the social-discounting aspect, the pure-risk
aspect, and the consumption-smoothing aspect."142
Unlike the basic Arrow-Lind theorem, Arrow and Fisher's emphasis on
irreversibility assigns maximum value to uncertainty. Within the basic
specification of an economic signal's variability, var(s) = var(v) + var(e), these
theoretical frames assume that var(e) is much greater than zero. At levels less
apocalyptic than those characterizing the dismal theorem (which effectively
assumes that var(e) approaches infinity), uncertainty may be modeled as the
volatility of certain fundamental measures (such as growth in cash flow or
dividends), conditioned on a time-varying measure of aversion.1 43 Markets with
indeterminate variance 44  are sometimes modeled according to stable
137. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (2018); 50 C.F.R. § 402.09 (2017); see also, e.g., Conner v.
Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1455 n.34 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Section 7(d) does not [mean] ... that a biological opinion
is not required before the initiation of agency action so long as there is no irreversible or irretrievable
commitment of resources."); N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 356 (D.D.C. 1980) (describing
§ 7(d) as intended "to prevent Federal agencies from 'steam rolling' activity in order to secure completion of
projects regardless of their impact on endangered species."), afj'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
138. Arrow & Fisher, supra note 134, at 319.
139. Id
140. William D. Nordhaus, The Economics of Tail Events with an Application to Climate
Change, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 240, 240 (2011).
141. Id
142. Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic
Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 18 (2009); see also id. at 10-12 (specifying the dismal theorem
in formal mathematical terms).
143. See, e.g., Geert Bekaert et al., Risk, Uncertainty, and Asset Prices, 91 J. FIN. ECON.
59 (2009).
144. See, e.g., BENOIT B. MANDELBROIT, THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE 337-38
(1983); Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior ofStock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34,43-45 (1965); cf Farber, supra
note 100, at 923-24 n.95 (explaining why the law of large numbers does not "shrink down" the sample mean




distributions,'4 5 despite their mathematical intractability and poor empirical
fit.1 46 Using the variance risk premium 47 as a proxy for uncertainty may explain
risk factors known by nameS1 48 such as jump risk,1 49 tail risk,' and rare disaster
risk.'
This account of uncertainty connects the environmental economics of
irretrievably committed resources with sunk costs in microeconomics, the theory
of contestable markets in industrial organization, and costly reversibility in
finance. Pairing this narrative with expressions for individual components of
economic signals and for variability in those signals provides a generalized
framework for evaluating regulatory uncertainty. Especially for industries such
as a future zero-carbon electrical system, these insights portend "a relatively high
cost of capital" and "very challenging" financial issues for industries facing
"large, capital-intensive" investments, "long time horizons" and "uncertainty
regarding performance, future prices, and regulations."152 To ground those
potentially grave implications in legal principles, I now discuss the regulatory
determination of return on utility assets.
III. Conventional Rate of Return Determinations
A. Cost-of-Service Ratemaking
The task of price regulation at "the heart of public utility regulation" has
drawn deep scom.1 53 "The Supreme Power who conceived gravity, supply and
demand, and the double helix must have been absorbed elsewhere when public
utility regulation was invented."1 54 Rate regulation has earned opprobrium as
145. See, e.g., S. Ortobelli L & S.T. Rachev, Safety-First Analysis and Stable Paretian
Approach to Porfolio Choice Theory, 34 MATH. & COMPUTER MODELING 1037 (2001).
146. See CAMPBELL, LO & MACKINLAY, supra note 99, at 18; James A. Xiong & Thomas
M. Idzorek, The Impact of Skewness and Fat Tails on the Asset Allocation Decision, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
March/April 2011, at 23, 24.
147. See Turan G. Bali & Hao Zhou, Risk, Uncertainty, and Expected Returns, 51 J.
FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 707, 708 (2016) (defining the variance risk premium as the difference between
realized variance and the variance swap rate); Peter Carr & Liuren Wu, Variance Risk Premiums, 22 REV.
FIN. STUD. 1311 (2009); George J. Jiang & Yisong S. Tian, Model-Free Implied Volatility and Its
Information Content, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 1305 (2005).
148. See Bali & Zhou, supra note 147, at 709-10 n.4.
149. See Itamar Drechsler & Amir Yaron, What's Volatility Got to Do with It?, 24 REV.
FIN. STUD. 1 (2011); Viktor Todorov, Variance Risk Premium Dynamics: The Role of Jumps, 23 REV.
FIN. STUD. 345 (2010).
150. See Tim Bollerslev & Viktor Todorov, Tails, Fears, and Risk Premia, 66 J. FIN.
2165 (2011); Bryan Kelly & Hao Jiang, TailRisk and Asset Prices, 80 ECONOMETRICA 559 (2012).
151. See Xavier Gabaix, Variable Rare Disasters: An Exactly Solved Framework for
Ten Puzzles in Macro-Finance, 127 Q.J. ECON. 645 (2012).
152. Boyd, supra note 6, at 1689-90.
153. 1 ALFRED KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
20(1988).
154. F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
537 (1st ed. 1970); accord GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE
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"the most speculative undertaking ... in the history of [Anglo-American]
jurisprudence."
But ratemaking is neither lawless nor incoherent. Although courts today do
not bind ratemaking agencies to "any single formula or combination of
formulae," 5 6 stable patterns have emerged. Admittedly, neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the statutory "just and reasonable" ratemaking standard has
enacted discounted cash flow analysis, the efficient market hypothesis, or capital
asset pricing. '5  Those are the terms, however, by which rate regulation has
priced utility services and shaped demand for utility stock.
Ratemaking traces its roots to the Supreme Court's 1898 decision in Smyth
v. Ames. 5  Smyth is simultaneously celebrated and derided for its declaration
that "the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of ... rates to be
charged by a [public utility] must be the fair value of the property being used by
it for the convenience of the public."1 59 To clarify this baffling formula, the Court
offered a list of factors: "the original cost of construction, the amount expended
in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of [utility] bonds and
stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the
probable earning capacity of the property ... and the sum required to meet
operating expenses."'60
Smyth prescribed rates according to "the cost of providing the service"
rather than "some other basis," especially "demand for the service." 6 ' In
defending a competing definition of cost as the historic sum of prudent
investments, Justice Brandeis restated Smyth as encompassing "not only
operating expenses, but also capital changes" covering "interest, for the use of
the capital; . . . [an] allowance for risk incurred; and enough more to attract
capital."' 62 Any rate that gives the utility "the opportunity to earn the cost of...
service" should be deemed "constitutionally compensatory."163
20 (1994); Stuart Buck, TELRIC vs. Universal Service: A Takings Violation?, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 8
(2003).
155. West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 689 (1935) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
156. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
157. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 926 F.2d 1206, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1991); cf Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
158. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
159. Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546; accord Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 41 (1909)
("There must be a fair return upon the reasonable value of the property at the time it is being used for the
public."); Minn. Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 434 (1913) (describing fair value as "a reasonable judgment
having its basis in a proper consideration of all relevant facts.")
160. Smyth, 169 U.S. at 546-47.
161. Louis SCHWARTZ ET AL., FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
GOVERNMENT REGULATION 369 (6th ed. 1985).






Subsequent "methodology for establishing the cost of providing [utility]
service" followed "a formula implicit in the Smyth opinion":164
RR = r- B + OC+ T
where
RR: revenue requirement




Although all of these variables spark ratemaking disputes,'65 the "cost of
common equity is frequently ... a point of contention."166 Among the three
elements of a regulated firm's cost of capital (long-term debt, preferred stock,
and common stock),1 67 the rate of return on equity is often most fiercely
contested, not least because that factor dictates market capitalization. Return on
equity must be "sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the
enterprise."1 68 Focusing on theoretical implications for regulatory economics,
Part III now evaluates judicial standards for determining the cost of equity.
Smyth's fair value standard faltered in practice. "In theory the ... fair value
standard mimics the operation of the competitive market," inasmuch as
"investments [whose] benefits exceed their costs ... reward [utilities] with an
164. SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 161, at 369; see, e.g., Williston Basin Interstate
Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 1999); RICHARD E. MATHENY, TAXATION OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES § 2.04 (2014); Darin W. Kempke, Regulated Utilities, in 2 ACCOUNTANTS HANDBOOK: SPECIAL
INDUSTRIES AND SPECIAL TOPICS, at 36-6 to 36-11 (D.R. Carmichael & Lynford Graham eds., 12th ed.
2012).
165. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. FERC, 114 F.3d 1252,1263 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (disputing the
use of cost data after a utility's test period, see 18 C.F.R. § 154.303(a)(4)); Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 885
F.2d 962, 964 (1st Cir. 1989) (contesting the rate base).
166. Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 164 F.3d 54, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
see Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 926 F.2d 1206, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1991); NEPCO Munic. Rate Comm. v.
FERC, 668 F.2d 1327, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
167. See N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. FERC, 42 F.3d 659, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1994); New England
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 390 A.2d 8,32 (Me. 1978). Regulators often invoke "double leverage"
to limit returns attributable to a utility holding company's lower cost of debt. See, e.g., Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 593 S.W.2d 434, 444 (1980); New England, 390 A.2d at 41; State v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 706 S.W.2d 870, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). See generally Richard H. Pettway & Bradford D.
Jordon, Diversification, Double Leverage, and the Cost of Capital, 6 J. FIN. RESEARCH 289 (1983); Michael
S. Rozeff, Modified Double Leverage-A New Approach, PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY, March 31, 1983, at
31-36.
168. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); accord, e.g.,
United States v. FCC, 707 F.2d 610, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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opportunity to earn an 'above-cost' return."'6 9 Fair value demanded
consideration of prevailing prices and wages, as well as "an honest and
intelligent forecast as to probable price and wage levels during. . . the immediate
future."' At its most speculative, fair value emboldened a prediction, based on
"judicial notice of the fact that there ha[d] been no substantial general decline in
the price of labor and materials" for roughly a dozen years, that prices would not
be "likely to decline within . . . one, two, or three years."' 7 ' Within three years
of this November 22, 1926, declaration, the stock market crash of October 1929
triggered the Great Depression.
As the Supreme Court later observed with respect to taxation, "the
Constitution [does not] tolerate any result, however distorted, just because it is
the product of a convenient mathematical formula."1 72 Practical difficulties
plagued the valuation of property whose owners bore legal obligations unique to
their industry.1 73 Justice Brandeis defended his "prudent investment" rule as an
administratively convenient alternative to the "laborious and baffling task of
finding ... present value" for utilities "not commonly bought and sold in the
market."1 74
Commentators likewise condemned Smyth as "rest[ing] upon a giant
illusion."17 5 Even courts recognizing that "value depends upon the earnings"
foolishly "insist[ed] that the vicious circle involved (in basing the earnings on
the value) can be escaped merely by the simple expedient of measuring the value
of replacement cost. "176 The entire enterprise, which Smyth called an
"embarrassing question,"'7 7 ranked "among the great juristic myths of history
with the Law of Nature and the Social Contract." 7 7 By 1944, the Supreme Court
capitulated: "rates cannot be made to depend upon 'fair value' when the value of
the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates may be
anticipated."1 79
169. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 (1989).
170. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 408 (1926).
171. Id at 412.
172. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Mo. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317,327 (1968); cf CSX
Transp., Inc. v. Georgia State Bd. of Equalization, 552 U.S. 9, 16-17 (2007) ("Valuation is not a matter of
mathematics, as if ... [a] court could prevent discriminatory taxation simply by double-checking ...
assessment equations.").
173. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 309.
174. Mo. ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 292 (1923)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Nor can the present value of the utility be determined by capitalizing its net
earnings, since the earnings are determined ... by the rate which the company will be permitted to charge
175. Gerard Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts (Part 3), 33 HARV. L. REV.
1031, 1051 (1920).
176. Robert Lee Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy in Rate Cases, 30 YALE L.J. 710,
716 (1921).
177. Smythv. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898).
178. Henderson, supra note 175, at 1051.
179. Hope Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 320 U.S. 591,601 (1944); accord Robert




B. Bluefield's Two Standards
But three weeks after Justice Brandeis proposed prudent investment as an
alternative to Smyth's fair value standard, the Supreme Court provided further
guidance on determining the rate of return,' which remains good law,
notwithstanding the Court's later embrace of prudent investment as a permissible
(but not required) basis for valuation.'
Bluefield prescribed not one but two sets of guidelines. The first, the
"comparable investment' rule, promised "such rates as will permit" the utility
"to earn a return . .. equal to that generally being made at the same time and in
the same general part of the country on investments in other business
undertakings which are attended by corresponding, risks and uncertainties," but
not the return "anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative
ventures."'18 2
Bluefield's second approach prescribes rates "reasonably sufficient to
assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility" and "adequate . . . to
maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the
proper discharge of its public duties."' 83 Utilities must earn returns sufficient to
"attract capital" and "compensate investors for the risks assumed."' 8 4 Rates that
"compensate[] investors" and "attract capital" should cover "operating expenses,
debt service, and dividends."'
Three years before the Supreme Court directly addressed the issue, Learned
Hand anticipated the congruence of Bluefield's two standards. "The recurrent
appeal to a just rate and a fair value," he wrote, "involves a tacit comparison of
the profit under the rate with profits available elsewhere; i.e., under those
competitive enterprises which offer an alternative investment."1 86 Judge Hand's
(praising the Court's "tardy but conclusive demonstration of the fair value fallacy"); id. at 530 (dismissing
"the costly and meaningless rituals ofSmyth v. Ames.").
180. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679
(1923). Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923), was argued
December 8, 1922, and decided May 21, 1923. Argued on January 22, 1923, Bluefield was decided June 11,
1923, 21 days after Southwestern Bell.
181. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 316 & n.10 (1989); cf Fed. Power
Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 387 (1974) ("The [Natural Gas] Act directs that all producer rates be
just and reasonable, but it does not specify the means by which that regulatory prescription is to be fulfilled.");
Hope, 320 U.S. at 602 ("It is not theory, but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of
the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry . .. is at an end.").
182. Bluejield, 262 U.S. at 692-93.
183. Id. at 693.
184. Hope, 320 U.S. at 605; accordA. LAWRENCE KOLBE ET AL., THE COST OF CAPITAL:
ESTIMATING THE RATE OF RETURN FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES 13 (1984) ("The cost of capital is the minimum
rate of return necessary to attract capital to an investment.").
185. Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 389 N.E.2d 325, 328 (Mass. 1978); accord
State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 706 S.W.2d 870, 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); see also United States v. FCC,
707 F.2d 610, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Regulated utilities are entitled to earn enough revenue not only to cover
operating expenses but also to pay for the capital costs of doing business, including service on debt and
dividends on stock.").
186. Consol. Gas Co. v. Newton, 267 F. 231, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
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"statement of the comparable-earnings standard" recognized that "attracting
capital" requires offsetting the opportunity cost of alternative investments. 8 7
Judge Hand and Bluefield reflected the modem understanding of
opportunity cost as "the cost associated with opportunities that are forgone by
not putting [a] firm's resources to their best alternative use."188 Opportunity cost
offsets the behavioral impact of sunk cost.' 89 Whereas sunk cost is "usually
visible" but "should always be ignored," opportunity cost "is often hidden" but
must always "be taken into account."190 Irrational consideration of sunk costs
often prompts conduct based on previous investment.191 Agents are sometimes
"too much invested to quit."1 92 Regulatory accounting should not compound
such irrationality.
Bluefield's "two conceptions are obviously intertwined."1 93 Proper
understanding of the regulatory rate of return begins more intuitively with a firm-
specific focus on the conditions that would induce investors to bypass other
options. Justice Brandeis recognized that a continuous "inflow of [new] capital"
into a regulated firm "can only be assured by treatment of capital already
invested," so that fairness toward existing investors "will invite and encourage
further investment." 194
Bluefield's two standards coexist today alongside a model derived from
corporate finance. Parts IV and V will examine all three models.
187. Harold Leventhal, Vitality of the Comparable Earnings Standard for Regulation of
Utilities in a Growth Economy, 74 YALE L.J. 989, 1004 (1965).
188. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 52, § 7.1, at 238; see also id. § 15.4, at 584
(defining the opportunity cost of capital).
189. See Shane Frederick et al., Opportunity Cost Neglect, 36 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH
553 (2009).
190. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 52, § 7.1, at 239; accord, e.g., Stephen Palmer
& James Rafferty, Opportunity Cost, 318 BRITISHMED. J. 1551 (1999).
191. See Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Costs, 35 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1985); cf Hal R. Arkes & Peter Ayton, The Sunk Cost and
Concorde Effects: Are Humans Less Rational Than Lower Animals, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 591, 591 (1999)
(describing "the tendency of lower animals to commit to the sunk cost effect" and citing Richard Dawkins &
Tamsin R. Carlisle, Parental Investment, Mate Desertion and a Fallacy, 262 NATURE 131 (1976); Robert L.
Trivers, Parent-Offspring Conflict, 14 AM. ZOOLOGIST 249 (1974)).
192. ALLAN I. TEGER, TOO MUCH INVESTED TO QUIT (1980).
193. Leventhal, supra note 187, at 1004.





IV. Regulatory Asset Pricing After Bluefield
A. Attracting Capital
1. Discounted Cash Flow
A 1991 D.C. Circuit case, Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC,195
illustrates pitfalls in determining a return sufficient to attract capital. In setting
gas pipeline rates under section 4 of the Natural Gas Act,1 96 FERC reasoned "that
investors are not able to account fully for the effects of a decline in interest rates
on their investment alternatives until some six months or more after those rates
are published."1 97 That assertion invited withering scrutiny of FERC's
discounted cash flow (DCF) methodology.
"DCF analysis" assumes "that the price of a stock is the current value of all
expected future cashflows, discounted at the rate of return."1 98 DCF assumes that
the price of stock equals the present value of a company's dividend stream,





DI: Next year's dividend
r: Rate of return
g: Rate of growth
Solving for r, the rate of growth, yields r = D1 /P0 + g. That "key
equation ... employs the current price of the utility, because price is understood
to represent the best possible assessment of . .. available information."200
Discounted cash flow analysis enjoys a prominent role in utility
economics. 201 In 1966, Lionel Thatcher proposed that the Federal
195. 926 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
196. 15 U.S.C. § 717c (2018).
197. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 926 F.2d 1206, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
198. Id. at 1210.
199. See, e.g., KOLBE ET AL., supra note 184, at 54; ROGER A. MORIN, UTILITIES' COST
OF CAPITAL 82, 119-20 (1984).
200. Tenn. Gas, 926 F.2d at 1210.
201. See, e.g., General Tel. Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 275 N.W.2d 364,369
(Iowa 1979); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 390 A.2d 8, 36 (Me. 1978).
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Communications Commission adopt an earnings-price model identical to the
DCF model in Tennessee Gas.202 Because the simple ratio of earnings to price
allegedly "understate[d] true capital costs by failing to account for investor
expectations of future growth," Thatcher proposed "a 'growth factor' determined
by the ratio of dividends to the book value of stock adjusted for growth." 203
In his final scholarly work before being appointed to the D.C. Circuit,
Harold Leventhal recognized that "it is mathematically sound"-albeit with
"simplifying assumptions" "to express the capital attracting rate for equity as
equal to . . . [the] dividend-price ratio . . . plus the anticipated growth rate in
earnings per share."2 04 r = D/Po + g "is a tautology," Leventhal admitted.205
"[B]ut it is a correct tautology." 206
2. Gordon Growth Model
The Gordon growth model describes stock prices as a function of dividends
and dividend growth rates:207
D(1 + g)
r + i - g
where r is the risk-free rate, P is the stock price, D is the current dividend,
g is the expected rate of dividend growth and 7 is the equity risk premium. 208
The Gordon growth model holds even when interest rates, growth rates, and the
risk premium change, 209 provided that "the long-run growth rate, g, is ...
interpreted as a weighted average of expected future growth rates." 210 Holding
the equity risk premium to zero and redefining D(1+g) as a forward-looking
dividend D(1+g) = Di-reveals the DCF formula in Tennessee Gas as a special
case of the Gordon growth model:
D(1 + g) DO
P = r<-+T- PO = g i = 0, D, = D (1 + g)
r -g r g
202. See Robert J. Gelhaus & Gary D. Wilson, Note, An Earnings-Price Approach to Fair
Rate ofReturn in Regulated Industries, 20 STAN. L. REV. 287, 290 & n.9 (1968).
203. Id at 290.
204. Leventhal, supra note 187, at 1009.
205. Id at 1009 n.72.
206. Id
207. See Myron J. Gordon & Eli Shapiro, Capital Equipment Analysis: The Required
Rate of Profits, 3 MGMT. SC. 102 (1956); Myron J. Gordon, Dividends, Earnings and Stock Prices, 41
REV. ECON. & STAT. 99 (1959).
208. See John H. Boyd et al., The Stock Market's Reaction to Unemployment News:
Why Bad News Is Usually Good for Stocks, 60 J. FIN. 649, 660 (2005).
209. See Ravi Jagannathan et al., The Declining U.S. Equity Premium, FED. RESERVE
BANK MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV., Fall 2000, at 3.




Further simplification may be achieved by holding dividend growth to zero.
In that event, the rate of return is simply the ratio of forward-looking dividends
to current stock price :211
r , PO = D
PO r
The simple ratio of earnings to stock price "generat[es] that level of
earnings necessary to maintain the share price at the attributed rate base per
share," where investors will buy utility stock.212 Among other criticisms of a
straightforward calculation of the "going rate of return ... directly from the
market evaluation of. . .utility stock," 213 is the allegation that the eamings-price
ratio "is particularly inapplicable to a new venture, whose observed stock price
reflects anticipated rather than current earnings."214 Simple implementations of
the Gordon growth model may not capture all macroeconomic factors affecting
stock prices and firm valuations.2 15
Its very simplicity, however, enables the Gordon growth model to
accommodate numerous assumptions. Many authors "extend the simplest
Gordon growth model to allow dividend growth rates to have several stages." 216
Some models "permit[] growth firms to start with high dividend growth rates and
then decelerate to a stable long-run rate."217 Others "propose random but
independent dividend growth rates." 218 One "variant of the Gordon growth
model . . . us[es] the assumption that the log dividend price ratio follows a
random walk"- Dt+1/Pt = exp (xt), where xt = xt+1 + Et "denotes the log
dividend-price ratio using a forward or indicated dividend rather than a historical
dividend." 219
211. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, THE INTELLIGENT ASSET ALLOCATOR: HOW TO
BUILD YOUR PORTFOLIO TO MAXIMIZE RETURNS AND MINIMIZE RISK 112-13, 192 (2001) (defining price-
to-earnings and price-to-book ratios).
212. Gelhaus & Wilson, supra note 202, at 295.
213. Leonard M. Ross, Comments on the Earnings-Price Note, 21 STAN. L. REV. 644,644
(1969); see also Posner, supra note 46, at 625-27.
214. Ross, supra note 213, at 645.
215. See, e.g., Marcus Jackson, The Gordon Growth Model and the Income Approach to
Value, 62 APPRAISAL J. 124 (1994); Michael T. Kiley, Stock Prices and Fundamentals: A Macroeconomic
Perspective, 77 J. BUS. 909 (2004) (comparing the Gordon growth model during the 1990s disfavorably with
dynamic general equilibrium models over that period).
216. Mark Kamstra, Pricing Firms on the Basis of Fundamentals, ECON REV. FED.
RESERVE BANK ATLANTA, 1st Quarter 2013, at 49, 50. Accord, e.g., James L. Farrell, Jr., The Dividend
Discount Model: A Primer, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov./Dec. 1985, at 16; William J. Hurley & Lewis D. Johnson,
A Realistic Dividend Valuation Model, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July/Aug. 1994, at 50; James A. Ohlson, Earnings,
Book Values, and Dividends in Equity Valuation, 11 CONTEMP. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 661 (1995); Eric
H. Sorenson & David A. Williamson, Some Evidence on the Value of Dividend Discount Models, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Nov./Dec. 1985, at 60.
217. Kamstra, supra note 216, at 50.
218. Id.
219. John Y. Campbell, Estimating the Equity Premium, 41 CAN. J. ECON. 1, 10 (2008).
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Tennessee Gas represented a stark departure from established principles of
discounted cash flow analysis and other dividend growth models. FERC's effort
to defend "a 'pragmatic adjustment"'. on the basis of an alleged "lag in the decline
of dividend yields following [a] decline in interest rates" raised an "intolerable
conflict with [DCF] principles."2 20 "Everything else being equal, a decline in
interest rates means a decline in dividend yields, as stocks and bonds compete
for investors' capital." 22 1 Declining rates drive capital from bonds into stocks,
causing the price of utility stock to rise and its yield to drop.222 Even sources
cited by FERC identified utility stocks "as especially close substitutes of bonds"
in light of "their (historically) low levels of risk" and similar sensitivity to
interest rates. 223
3. Efficient Market Hypothesis
Even more importantly, FERC's handling of interest-rate evidence,
especially its "lag theory" of delayed investor reactions to interest-rate changes,
constituted "a frontal assault on 'the cornerstone of modem investment theory,'
the Efficient Market Hypothesis." 224 The "strong" form of the efficient market
hypothesis posits that security prices reflect all information, public and private,
and that the prevalence of this knowledge prevents investors from earning excess
returns. 225 "[I]n an efficient market, there is no way for most investors to achieve
consistently superior rates of return." 226 Empirical measures of investment
220. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 926 F.2d 1206, 1209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also
Martin Lettau & Sydney Ludvigson, Consumption, Aggregate Wealth, and Expected Stock Returns, 56 J.
FIN. 815, 819 (2001) (proposing "a 'Gordon growth model' for human capital by assuming that expected
returns to human capital are constant and labor income follows a random walk"). For firms too new or
speculative to have reliable dividend information, models use alternatives to dividends. See, e.g., ASWATH
DAMODARAN, DAMODARAN ON VALUATION: SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR INVESTMENT AND CORPORATE
FINANCE 244-48 (1994) (sales); WILLIAM F. SHARPE & GORDON J. ALEXANDER, INVESTMENTS 474-76 (4th
ed. 1990) (earnings and payout ratios).
221. Tenn. Gas, 926 F.2d at 1209.
222. Id; accord MORIN, supra note 199, at 30.
223. Tenn. Gas, 926 F.2d at 1211 (citing JEROME BERNARD COHEN ET AL., INVESTMENT
ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 27-28 (5th ed. 1987)); see, e.g., K. Chen & Daniel Tzang, Interest-
Rate Sensitivity ofReal Estate Investment Trusts, 3:3 J. REAL ESTATE RES. 13 (1988); Mark J. Flannery &
Christopher M. James, The Effect of Interest Rate Changes on the Common Stock Returns of Financial
Institutions, 39 J. FIN. 1141 (1984); Glenn Mueller & Keith Pauley, The Effect of Interest-Rate Movements
on Real Estate Investment Trusts, 10 J. REAL ESTATE RES. 319 (1995); Richard J. Sweeney & Arthur D.
Warga, The Pricing ofInterest-Rate Risk: Evidence from the Stock Market, 41 J. FIN. 393 (1986).
224. Tenn. Gas, 926 F.2d at 1211 (quoting MORIN, supra note 199, at 140 n.4).
225. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, 46 J. FIN. 1575
(1991); Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965); Lawrence H.
Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986); Eugene
F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns, 47 J. FIN. 427, 427-29
(1992).
226. RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 330 (10th ed.
2011); accord Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 462 (2013); see also Tenn.
Gas, 926 F.2d at 1211 ("[1]f the stock market is such a laggard, the members of the Commission ... would




outcomes suggest that efficient markets, even if not omniscient or frictionless,
do eliminate excess returns, at least with respect to individual securities or other
small samples.227
Even less stringent versions of the efficient market hypothesis bode ill for
excess returns.228 The weak version posits that markets assimilate all public
information.2 29 The semi-strong version assumes immediate diffusion of public
information into security prices.230 Acceptance of the efficient market hypothesis
in weak form eliminates excess returns from technical analysis.23' The semi-
strong version defeats fundamental analysis.232 Disproving the presence of serial
dependencies in security prices would confirm at least the weak hypothesis.233
By citing evidence that markets assimilated surprising news regarding the
discount rate, money supply, inflation, and real economic activity within one
day, Tennessee Gas acknowledged at least the weak form of the hypothesis.234
The law of regulated industries is likely to follow federal securities law.
The "fraud on the market" rule presumes that "the market price of shares traded
on well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information and, hence,
any material misrepresentations," and that the typical investor who trades at
market price relies "on the integrity of that price."23 5 In adopting the "fraud on
the market" theory, the Supreme Court has "relied upon the 'semi-strong'
version" of the efficient market hypothesis. 236
227. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-Section
ofMutual Fund Returns, 65 J. FIN. 1915 (2010).
228. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral
Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 463-64 (2006).
229. See Paul A. Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate
Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 41 (1965).
230. See, e.g., FRANK K. REILLY, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT 215 (1989).
231. See ANDREW W. LO & JASMINA HASANHODZIC, THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNICAL
ANALYSIS: FINANCIAL PREDICTION FROM BABYLONIAN TABLETS TO BLOOMBERG TERMINALS 150
(2010).
232. See id.
233. See Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34, 34
(1965); Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept./Oct. 1965, at
55, 56-57.
234. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 926 F.2d 1206, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing
Douglas K. Pierce & V. Vance Roley, StockPrices and Economic News, 59 J. BUS. 49 (1985)).
235. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988). Violations of section 10(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018), and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2017), support an implied private cause of action. See,
e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 460-61 (2013); Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
236. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2420 (2014) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An
Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 640 & n.24 (2003); Fama, Efficient Capital Markets:
A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, supra note 225, at 388).
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Despite criticism that this presumption rests on unfounded acceptance of
efficiency,2 37 the Supreme Court has declined to recognize "the kind of
fundamental shift in economic theory that could justify overruling" the fraud on
the market rule. 38 The Court continues "to presume that most investors-
knowing that they have little hope of outperforming the market in the long run
based solely on their analysis of public available information will rely on the
security's market price as an unbiased assessment of the security's value in light
of all public information." 239
These presumptions collide with more sophisticated understandings of
investor heterogeneity and of limits on corrective arbitrage. A market "composed
solely of information traders" is a market "where price efficiency and the CAPM
hold" and where "[r]isk premia are determined solely by beta and distribution of
returns on the market portfolio." 240 But markets host sentiment-driven noise
traders as well as fully informed, rational traders.24' As "noise traders weaken
the relation between security returns and beta" and "create a positive conditional
correlation between abnormal returns and beta," 242 "steady and forceful"
pressure upon "the twin paradigms of price efficiency and the CAPM" compels
a "behavioral theory of capital asset prices. "243
The rise of indexes and index-based investing244 facilitates self-segregation
among investors and information-gathering intermediaries. 245  Even
sophisticated agents exhibit herding behavior.246 Delays in the diffusion of
237. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & David E. Runkle, Solving a Profound Flaw in
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory: Utilizing a Derivative ofArbitrage Pricing Theory to Measure Rule 10b-5
Damages, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1110-13 (1997); James D. Cox, Understanding Causation in Private
Securities Lawsuits: Building on Amgen, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1719, 1732 (2013) (arguing that "friction in
accessing public information" and nontrivial "processing costs" prevent markets from incorporating "all
public information ... with any quickness at all"); Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking
Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 175 ("Doubts about the strength and pervasiveness of
market efficiency are much greater today than they were in the mid-1980s."); Baruch Lev & Meiring de
Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 7, 20-21 (1994).
238. Halliburton Co., 134 S. Ct. at 2410; see also Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679,
685 (7th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that false statements affect even mispriced stocks).
239. Amgen, 568 U.S. at 462; accord Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2411.
240. Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, Behavioral Capital Asset Pricing Theory, 29 J.
FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 323, 323 (1994).
241. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986); Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey
Wurgler, Investor Sentiment in the Stock Market, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2007, at 129.
242. Shefrin & Statman, supra note 240, at 346; Merritt B. Fox et al., Containing Systemic
Risk by Taxing Banks Properly, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (2018).
243. Shefrin & Statman, supra note 240, at 323. See generally Allan W. Kleidon,
Anomalies in Financial Economics: Blueprint for Change?, 59 J. BUS. 469 (1986) (describing how
anomalies spur theoretical advances).
244. See Anand M. Vijh, S&P 500 Trading Strategies and Stock Betas, 7 REV. FIN. STUD.
215 (1994).
245. See Nicholas Barberis & Andrei Shleifer, Style Investing, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 161
(2003).
246. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Joshua Mitts, Anti-Herding Regulation, 5 HARV. Bus. L.
REV. 1 (2015); Kenneth A. Froot et al., Herd on the Street: Informational Efficiencies in a Market with




information affecting prices imply that some stock groups-including utility
stocks as a distinct asset class "incorporate new information at different
rates."247 Observed delays in the diffusion of information implies that noise
trader risk diminishes the corrective potential of arbitrage.248
B. Comparable Earnings
One final aspect of Tennessee Gas offers insight into the relationship
between Bluefield's attracting investment and comparable earnings standards.
FERC relied exclusively on interest-sensitive "estimates of ... [the] cost of
equity capital."2 49 FERC made no effort to "measure [the] industry rate of return
or" the pipeline's "relative risk within the industry."250
But such evidence was available. Company-specific factors, beyond
interest rate changes, might have reflect changes in business or financial risk
affecting the utility's cost of capital. "[C]ompany-specific risk" through a
substantial increase in "the spread between Tenneco's bond yields and the risk-
free yield" indicated "that investors thought Tenneco was becoming riskier."25 '
Failure to address this evidence compounded FERC's vulnerability, 25 2
particularly in light of precedent distinguishing purely interest-sensitive
adjustments in regulatory rate-of-retum determinationS 253 from the consideration
of firm-specific factors affecting earnings or dividends.254
This aspect of Tennessee Gas clarifies the relationship between utility stock
and the bond markets. The relevant comer of fixed-income markets is not
Treasuries, but corporate bonds derided as 'junk." 255 High-yield bonds correlate
closely to equities and bear similar risks.256 Low-rated corporate debt with high
and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465 (1990); cf Richard W. Sias,Institutional Herding, 17 REV. FIN.
STUD. 165 (2004) (concluding that institutional investors herd by inferring information from each other's
trades).
247. Nicholas Barberis et al., Comovement, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 298 (2005).
248. Compare J. Bradford DeLong et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J.
POL. ECON. 703, 705 (1990) (recognizing that the depth and duration of uninformed trading can disrupt
arbitrage), with Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Limits ofArbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 (1977) (describing
limits on the ability to exploit misinformed or irrational behavior). See generally Kenneth R. French &
Richard Roll, Stock Return Variances: The Arrival of Information and the Reaction of Traders, 17 J. FIN.
ECON. 5 (1986) (describing the price effects of uninformed demand).
249. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 926 F.2d 1206, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
250. Id. at 1213.
251. Id. at 1210.
252. See id. at 1212.
253. See Bos. Edison Co. v. FERC, 885 F.2d 962, 967 (1st Cir. 1989).
254. See Union Elec. Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 1193, 1201-04 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
255. See Frank K. Reilly & David J. Wright, An Analysis of High-Yield Bond
Benchmarks, J. FIXED INCOME, March 1994, at 6, 7 (describing high-yield bonds as "low-quality credits
that have characteristics of common stocks").
256. See, e.g., Edward I. Altman & Scott Nammacher, The Default Rate Experience on
High-Yield Corporate Debt, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July/Aug. 1985, at 25; Martin S. Fridson, Do High-Yield
Bonds Have an Equity Component?, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1994, at 82; Murali Ramaswami, Hedging the
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default risk exhibits informational efficiency similar to its issuer's stocks.257
High-yield bonds, coarsely speaking, are "equity in drag."25 8 More elegantly: "A
low-grade bond can be viewed as a hybrid security consisting of a government
bond and a claim on the issuing firm's equity." 259
Decomposing return on utility stock into bond-like and equity-like
components proves critical in explaining the relationship between Bluefield's
"attracting investment" and "comparable earning" standards. According to
Harold Leventhal's review260 of Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 261
Consolidated and its regulators had agreed "that the Constitution guaranteed" a
"return available without risk, such as return from government obligations."262
Treasury bonds as risk-free securities set a crucial benchmark in ratemaking and
utility valuation.
Despite ultimately reversing, the Supreme Court adopted the economic
analysis developed at trial. "One who invests his money in a business of a
somewhat hazardous character" has "the right to a larger return, without
legislative interference, than can be obtained from an investment in government
bonds or other perfectly safe security."263 Beyond this baseline, regulation
reduced "investment risk in a gas company . . . almost to a minimum. "264 Equity
in Consolidated, thanks to its lawful "monopol[y] [on] the gas service of the
largest city in America," represented as "secure [an] investment as can be
imagined with regard to any private manufacturing business."265
From Willcox to the 1968 Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,266 the
comparable earnings standard displaced "earnings-price ratio computations."267
"[C]omparative risk analysis" can be based on statistical evidence that "the ratio
of market price to book value of equity shares varies directly with positive risk
(growth possibilities) and inversely with negative risk (possibility of a decline in
Equity Risk of High-Yield Bonds, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept./Oct. 1991, at 41; Frank K. Reilly & David J.
Wright, Unique Risk-Return Characteristics ofHigh-Yield Bonds, J. FIXED INCOME, Sept. 2001, at 65.
257. See Dale L. Domian & William R. Reichenstein, Return-Based Analysis ofHigh-
YieldBonds, J. FIXED INCOME, Spring 2008, at 72; Edith S. Hotchkiss & Tavy Ronen, The Informational
Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market: An Intraday Analysis, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1325, 1348-52
(2015); see also id. at 1338-40, 1347 (finding that stocks do not lead high-yield bonds in assimilating
information, which is quickly incorporated into prices in both asset classes).
258. Jeremy I. Bulow et al., Distinguishing Debtfrom Equity in the Junk Bond Era, in
DEBT, TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 135 (John B. Shoven & Joel Waldfogel eds., 1990).
259. Hilary Shane, Comovements of Low-Grade Debt and Equity Returns of Highly
Leveraged Firms, J. FIXED INCOME, March 1994, at 79.
260. See Consol. Gas Co. v. City of N.Y., 157 F. 849 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907), rev'dsub nom.
Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
261. 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
262. Leventhal, supra note 187, at 996; see also id. at 995 n.19 (reporting that federal debt
obligations paid interest "from 2 to 4% depending on the date of flotation and maturity").
263. Willcox, 212 U.S. at 49.
264. Id
265. Id; see also Consolidated, 157 F. at 871 (characterizing the utility as "fairly safe local
property" that promised a return "sufficiently above the local mortgage market" to offset uninsurable risk).
266. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).




earnings and/or share price)."268 On these assumptions, "the proper rate of return
is that which maintains the company's market-book ratio on the same level as
'alternative investment opportunities,"' such as indexes of utility companies.269
Financial data involving other companies exposed the comparable earnings
standard's conceptual weakness. Permian Basin "emphasiz[ed] . . . returns on
equity earned by other gas companies" or even by oil producers, whose
"revenues ... were admittedly not regulated." 270 The very presence of rate
regulation ensures "that there is no company precisely comparable." 271 Either
"the category of comparative firms is so broad that it includes firms in the
unregulated sector," or an exclusive focus on "regulated rates ... in comparative-
risk analysis" renders "the test . . . circular." 272
Nevertheless, market pricing of utility stock promises "a built in self-
righting mechanism," insofar as "changing interest rates or capital-scarcity
conditions" will lead investors to "demand a greater or lesser return to hold the
stock." 273 By displacing a solipsistic, firm-specific focus, comparable earnings
approaches forced regulators to evaluate accounting-based assessments such as
the prudent investment rule or DCF in light of government bonds yields and
equity premiums for regulated and unregulated firms.
Before modem portfolio theory,274 "finance theory was little more than a
collection of anecdotes, rules of thumb, and manipulations of accounting
data," 275 The law of regulated industries anticipated two of the "most interesting
applications of probability and optimization theory" in finance276 : the efficient
market hypothesis and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Part V now
explores the CAPM and its application to rate regulation.
V. The Capital Asset Pricing Model
A. DCF and CAPMas Benchmarks Within a Zone ofReasonableness
Standard regulatory practice often deploys comparable earnings
methodologies in tandem with DCF analysis to establish a "zone of
reasonableness" for a utility's "rate of return on equity."277 Consistent with the
268. Gelhaus & Wilson, supra note 202, at 290.
269. Id at 290-91.
270. Leventhal, supra note 187, at 1012.
271. Gelhaus & Wilson, supra note 202, at 291.
272. Id
273. Id at 295.
274. See, e.g., EDWIN J. ELTON ET AL., MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (9th ed. 2014); Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber, Modern Portfolio Theory,
1950 to Date, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 1743 (1997).
275. Robert C. Merton, A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete
Information, 42 J. FIN. 483, 483 (1987).
276. Merton, supra note 275, at 483.
277. Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
accord N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. FERC, 42 F.3d 659, 661-62 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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Gordon growth model, FERC's regulation of oil pipelines uses "a discounted
cash flow . . . model" to "project[] investor growth expectations over the long
term by adding average dividend yields to estimated constant growth in
dividends over the indefinite future."278 FERC "then assigns the pipeline a rate
within" the zone of reasonableness as determined by DCF "to reflect specific
investment risks associated with that pipeline," relative "to a proxy group of
publicly traded companies." 279
Reference to a proxy group therefore performs the spatial equivalent of
using "long-term growth projection[s]" to normalize distortions otherwise
arising from exclusive reliance on "short-term data limited to a narrow segment
of the economy." 280 Short-term projections, ceteris paribus, are easier and more
reliable .281 But long-term projections hedge against "unanticipated
developments" that may undermine shorter forecasts.282 Checking financial
information generated by comparable firms likewise sharpens DCF analyses
based on one firm's earnings.
Before 1999, the Florida Public Service Commission supplemented two
DCF models applied to a water utility index with two additional comparable
earnings benchmarks.28 3 First, the PSC employed a "risk premium model applied
to an index of publicly traded natural gas utilities" as a proxy for water and
wastewater utilities with less ascertainable financial data.284 Second, the
Commission used an asset pricing model based on the market return of dividend-
paying stocks, the 30-year Treasury Bonds yield, and the average beta" of the
water utility index. 28 5
In 1999, Florida eliminated historical DCF in favor of "prospective, or
forecasted growth rates" based on "the historical trend in dividends." 286 The
Commission also eliminated risk adjustments extrapolated from the gas industry,
which it deemed "no longer a reasonable proxy." 28 7 Critically, the Commission
recognized that its "CAPM model, because it is a risk premium model, will
appropriately reflect the direction of interest rates as previously indicated by the
gas risk premium model." 288 This use of the CAPM has become prevalent. 28 9
278. Williston, 165 F.3d at 57.
279. Id
280. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 88 F.E.R.C.T61,057, atT 61,144 (July 14, 1999).
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. Returns on Common Equity for Water & Wastewater Utils., 194 P.U.R.4th 81, 83
(Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, June 21, 1999).
284. Id
285. Id
286. Id at 84.
287. Id
288. Id
289. See, e.g., AEP Tex. N. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 609 F.3d 432, 434-37, 439-44
(D.C. Cir. 2010); Connect Am. Fund, 28 F.C.C.R. 7123,7146-69 (2013); Represcribing the Authorized Rate
of Return for Interstate Servs. of Local Exch. Carriers, 5 F.C.C.R. 7507 (1990); A. Lawrence Kolbe et al.,




B. A Formal Description of the CAPM
The CAPM remains the dominant paradigm in financial risk
management.2 90 The development of "general models represent[ing] equivalent
approaches to the problem of capital asset pricing under uncertainty" gave rise
to today's CAPM.2 9 '
The capital asset pricing model boasts convenience and "seductive
simplicity." 292 The CAPM quantifies the premium for shouldering risk in an
asset, over a benchmark represented by the return on a risk-free investment:
r.= rf ± fla(rm - rf )
where ra, rm, and rfrepresent returns on the asset, the broader market and a risk-
free investment, and where ft represents the individual asset's beta vis-a-vis the
market portfolio.29 3
Rearrangement yields the following relationship:
r. rf arf
The left side of this equation represents the risk premium,294 the difference
between returns on an investment and the risk-free baseline. 295 The risk premium
dictates a firm's cost of capital.
C Beta
Beta provides the simplest measure of undiversifiable risk.296 It supplies
information on volatility and liquidity in the broader marketplace. While
measuring co-movement between a single security and the market as a whole,
beta does not "assum[e] away the existence of interrelationships among
securities," but nevertheless "captures a large part of such interrelationships."2 97
290. See HAIM LEVY, THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
ANALYTICAL, EMPIRICAL, AND BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES 4-5 (2012).
291. Eugene Fama, Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Some Clarifying Comments, 23 J.
FIN. 29,40 (1968).
292. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and
Evidence, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2004, at 25, 44.
293. See Robert A. Korajczyk, Introduction, in ASSET PRICING AND PORTFOLIO
PERFORMANCE: MODELS, STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE METRICS, at viii, xv (Robert A. Korajczyk ed.,
1999).
294. See id.
295. See William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium
Under Conditions ofRisk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 426 (1964).
296. See, e.g., Jack L. Treynor, How to Rate Management of Investment Funds, 43
HARV. Bus. REV. 63, 66 (1965).
297. William F. Sharpe, A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis, 9 MGMT. SCI. 277,
281 (1963).
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Beta of 1 indicates an asset whose sensitivity to risk is the same as the
broader market's.298 Positive values for beta below 1 indicate an asset that moves
in the market's direction, but is not as sensitive.2 99 Higher beta signals the need
for a higher return to attract investment in a presumably riskier company.300
Beta is a measure of systematic covariance: 301
cov(x,y) cov(x,y)
var(x) c7
Beta reports the relationship between returns on a single asset and returns
on the tradable universe.302 Beta as correlated relative relativity is the product of
(1) the ratio of asset-specific volatility to market-wide volatility and (2) the
correlation between asset-specific and market-wide retums: 303
m ) cov(a,m) cov(am) (xe - P) (xm - Pm))
/l -p am)2 -
a;~~~ P.o~; a;(x~ )2)Um Um Um Um. )
These elaborations of the CAPM make it easy to understand ratemaking as
asset pricing. Specifically designating an index of water utilities as the target
asset class yields a pricing model for water and wastewater utilities: 304
r.= rf + B. (r. - rf)
r,: "Investor's required rate of return"
rf: "Risk-free rate (Blue Chip forecast for 30-year Treasury bond)"
, u: "Measure of industry-specific risk (Average for water utilities followed by
Value Lines)"
r.: "Market return"
298. See MARK LEVINSON, GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MARKETS 148 (4th ed. 2006).
299. See id.
300. See, e.g., Korajczyk, supra note 293, at xv; William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset
Prices: A Theory ofMarketEquilibrium Under Conditions ofRisk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 427-28 (1964).
301. See, e.g., Irwin Friend & Marshall Blume, Measure of Portfolio Performance Under
Uncertainty, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 565 (1970).
302. See, e.g., SHANNON P. PRATT & ROGER J. GRABOWSKI, COST OF CAPITAL:
APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES 305-06 (4th ed. 2010).
303. See, e.g., MARTIN L. LEIBOWITZ ET AL., THE ENDOWMENT MODEL OF INVESTING:
RETURN, RISK, AND DIVERSIFICATION 14 (2010); MICHAEL B. MILLER, MATHEMATICS AND STATISTICS
FOR FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 198, 213, 292 (2d ed. 2014).
304. Returns on Common Equity for Water & Wastewater Utils., 194 P.U.R.4th 81, 89




The capital asset pricing model suffers from many weaknesses. Most
critically, beta is not positively related to returns on stock.305 Returns are
skewed306 and exhibit heavier than normal tails.307 Many risks follow abnormal,
non-Gaussian distributions. 308 Large swings of 3a to 6a occur so often that
"[e]xtreme price swings are the norm in financial markets not aberrations."309
The maximum price change in the American stock market from 1871 to 2010
was "a 'ten-sigma event,"' whose probability under "a normal distribution"
would be "less than once in the life of the universe."3 10
But attacks on "standard deviation and its variations" as measures of risk
in "non-normal distributions" have failed to dislodge beta,3 1' if only because
"relatively little effort has been made" to devise "a better risk measure."312 Beta's
leading nemesis has conceded that "market professionals (and academics) still
think about risk in terms of market fl." 313 Even models purporting to deprecate
beta as "insignificant" continue to treat beta as "an important explanatory
variable," despite refusing to treat beta as "the main explanatory variable."3 14
The CAPM thrives despite academic attacks. "It takes a better theory to kill
an existing theory," and finance has "yet to see [a] better theory."315 Empirical
support for other asset-pricing models is not better and "the economic
305. See, e.g., Fama & French, The Cross-Section ofExpected Stock Returns, supra note
225; Marc R. Reinganum,A New Empirical Perspective on the CAPM, 16 FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 439
(198 1); Seha M. Tinic & Richard R. West, Risk and Return: January vs. the Rest of the Year, 13 J. FIN.
ECON. 561 (1983).
306. See, e.g., Felipe M. Aparicio & Javier Estrada, Empirical Distributions of Stock
Returns: European Securities Markets, 1990-95, 7 EUR. J. FIN. 1 (2001); Pomchai Chunhachinda, et al.,
Portfolio Selection and Skewness: Evidence from International Stock Markets, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 143
(1997); Amado Peir6, Skewness in Financial Returns, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 847 (1999).
307. See, e.g., Harry M. Markowitz & Nilufer Usmen, The Likelihood of Various Stock
Market Return Distributions, Part 1: Principles of Inference, 13 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 207 (1996);
Harry M. Markowitz & Nilufer Usmen, The Likelihood of Various Stock Market Return Distributions,
Part 2: Empirical Results, 13 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 221 (1996); Terence C. Mills, Modelling Skewness
and Kurtosis in the London Stock Exchange FT-SE Index Return Distributions, 44 STATISTICIAN 323
(1995).
308. See, e.g., CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 99, at 17, 81, 172, 498.
309. BENOIT B. MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF
MARKETS: A FRACTAL VIEW OF RISK, RUIN, AND REWARD 18 (2004).
310. Nordhaus, supra note 140, at 242 (analyzing monthly stock changes over that 140-
year period).
311. Guy Kaplanski, Traditional Beta, Downside Risk Beta and Market Risk Prem iums,
44 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 636, 637 (2004).
312. Id.
313. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1593 (1991);
accord Glenn N. Pettengill et al., The Conditional Relation Between Beta and Returns, 30 J. FIN. &
QUANT. ANALYSIS 101, 102 (1995).
314. LEVY, supra note 290, at 4 (emphasis in original); cf Robert C. Merton, On
Estimating the Expected Return on the Market: An Exploratory Investigation, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 324
(1980) ("[I]n all ... models, the market risk of a security will affect its equilibrium expected return, and
indeed, for most common stocks, market risk will be the dominant factor.").
315. TIM KOLLER ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF
COMPANIES 261 (5th ed. 2010).
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importance of the empirical evidence against the CAPM ... is ambiguous.3 16
Courts continue to think of risk and asset pricing in terms of the CAPM.3 17 The
"concept of beta risk" represents "the single most important contribution of
academic researchers" to finance.318
VI. Utility Regulation as a Speculative Undertaking in Its own Right
The persistence of competing rules for utility valuation and rate-of-return
determinations demonstrates the uncertainty inherent in regulation. "[N]either
law nor economics has yet devised generally accepted standards . . . ."319 Utility
regulation "will always [raise] ... embarrassing question[s]" of indeterminacy
and inefficacy.320
Public utility law does bear an obligation to ensure an adequate return on
private investment. 321' The investment-backed expectations of utility
shareholders are based strictly on opportunity cost. "Any investor paying
attention" to the law must "realize that he [cannot] rely indefinitely on traditional
regulatory methods." 322 "[R]egulatory measures are temporary expedients, not
eternal verities." 323 Because the "Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies
to the service of any single formula or combination of formulas," 324 regulated
firms "have no vested interest in any particular [ratemaking] calculation." 325
316. Ravi Jagannathan & Zhenyu Wang, The Conditional CAPM and the Cross-
Section ofExpected Returns, 51 J. FIN. 3, 4 (1996) (footnote omitted).
317. See, e.g., In re Am. Classic Voyages Co., 367 B.R. 500, 513 n.19 (D. Del. Bankr.
2007) ("While there are other models to determine equity, CAPM is probably the most widely used."
(quoting Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W. Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 BUS. LAW. 419, 433 n.52
(1996)).
318. Louis K.C. Chan & Josef Lakonishok, Are Reports ofBeta's Death Premature?,
J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Summer 1993, at 5, 51; see also Jagannathan & Wang, supra note 316, at 4 ("The
CAPM is widely viewed as one of the two or three major contributions of academic research to financial
managers during the postwar era."). See generally Haim Levy, The CAPMIs Alive and Well: A Review
and Synthesis, 16 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 43 (2009).
319. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790 (1898); accord Duquesne Light
Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 (1989).
320. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898); accord Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308.
321. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); Bluefield
Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923); City of Chi. v. Fed.
Power Comm'n, 458 F.2d 731, 750-51 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
322. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 528 (2002) (describing regulatory
discretion as constrained solely by the "constitutional bar against confiscatory rates").
323. Fed. Power Comm'n v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 489 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
324. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942); accord
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 776-77 ("[R]ate-making agencies are not bound to the service
of any single regulatory formula; they are permitted ... to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be
called for by particular circumstances." (quotation omitted)).
325. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Ratemaking principles require simply that the "determination of fair prices" be
"based on reasonable financial requirements."3 26
"[T]he notion of lawfulness requires ... that the chosen framework" for
rate regulation "not collapse in practice into a standard-less exercise of
Commission discretion resting on no more than an assertion of 'expertise."'
327
"[T]he principle that 'lower is better,"' when presented as "an argument that
seems to have no end and little connection to any stated purpose," provides no
basis for affirming a ratemaking decision. 328 Regulators must justify any
particular methodological choice as an "appropriate rate reduction measure."32 9
Concededly, "a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential"
when an agency "is making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at
the frontiers of science."330 But review of administrative decisions routinely
requires judges to "acquire the learning pertinent to complex technical questions
in such fields as economics, science, technology and psychology." 331 To leave
all "to the skill of experts" is to deny that "[e]xpertise is a rational process and a
rational process implies expressed reasons for judgment." 332 Judges "should not
automatically succumb" to regulators' "acknowledged expertise ...
overwhelmed as it were by ... utter 'scientificity."' 333 "Restraint, yes,
abdication, no."334
Exclusive reliance on market forces abjures legal responsibility. "[T]he
prevailing price in the marketplace cannot be the final measure of 'just and
reasonable rates . . . ."33 Having chosen to "subject[] producers to regulation
because of anticompetitive conditions in the [gas] industry, Congress could not
326. Wisconsin v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 373 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1963); accord Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 315 (1989).
327. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 926 F.2d 1206, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also
Greater Boston T.V. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
328. Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC, 281 F.3d 239, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
329. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 329 (5th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002).
330. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983);
see also, e.g., Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion); id. at
705-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
331. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941; cf Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981)
(plurality opinion) (expressing willingness to invalidate "marginally" effective and "substantially" obtrusive
laws despite regulators' claimed expertise over "public health or safety").
332. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627 (1944) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
333. Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cf Jackson
v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 787 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, J.) (identifying "a widespread, and increasingly
troublesome, discomfort among lawyers and judges confronted by a scientific or other technological issue");
Edward K. Cheng, Fighting Legal Innumeracy, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 271, 276 (2014) (urging all "legal actors
. . . . to demand, without embarrassment, that quantitative researchers not only explain the conclusions of
their studies, but also how and why the methods work").
334. Ethyl, 541 F.2d at 69 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
335. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397 (1974).
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have assumed that 'just and reasonable' rates could conclusively be determined
by reference to market price."336
The obligation to articulate some defensible basis for a rate finds parallels
throughout the law of regulated industries. The power to "modify any
requirement" of title II of the Communications Act337 did not include the
requirement that carriers file tariffs,338 lest "a fundamental revision" create " a
scheme of rate regulation only where competition does not exist." 339 To like
effect is the admonition that a presumption of competition does not constitute
regulation of entry in the public interest. "Merely to assume that competition is
bound to be of an advantage, in an industry so regulated and so largely closed
... is not enough." 34 0
Even broader legal consilience connects regulatory valuation to taxation.
Bluefield's two methods (comparable earnings and attracting investment) and
Justice Brandeis's prudent investment rule precisely parallel the three recognized
methods for valuing real estate in ad valorem taxation.34 ' Property taxation
reveals the superiority of Bluefield's standards over prudent investment.
"[O]rdinarily the market data approach, guided ... by actual buyers and sellers
of comparable property in the market, is the best guide to market value."342 The
"market price" from "a recent, voluntary, arm's length transaction" between
"knowledgeable and willing" parties supplies "very persuasive" if "not
conclusive" evidence of value.343 The "income approach is the most effective
approach in determining the value of investment properties," especially "large
office buildings." 344 "Finally . . . the cost approach is the least reflective of
market value and is used only as a check of the estimates obtained from the other
approaches." 345
At least in taxation, exactly three methodologies-comparable earnings,
discounted cash flow, and accounting appear to exhaust the universe of feasible
approaches to valuation. All three approaches persist even as the valuation of
real property and ecosystem services incorporates large datasets of economic and
geographic information. 346 The question is whether valuation methodologies in
336. Id at 399.
337. 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (2018).
338. See id. § 203(a).
339. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1994).
340. FCA v. RCA Comm'cns, Inc., 346 U.S. 86,97 (1943); accord Haw. Tel. Co. v. FCC,
498 F.2d 771,776 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
341. See, e.g., Med. Bldg. Land Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 283 Or. 69, 582 P.2d 416, 421
& n.10 (1978) (recognizing valuation methods based on sales of comparable parcels, net income generated
by investment property, and construction cost net of depreciation); Elli Pagourtzi et al., RealEstate Appraisal:
A Review of Valuation Methods, 21 J. PROP. INV. & FIN. 383 (2003).
342. Med. Bldg. Land Co., 582 P.2d at 421 n.10.
343. Kem v. Dep't of Revenue, 267 Or. 111, 114, 514 P.2d 1335, 1336 (1973).
344. Med. Bldg. Land Co., 582 P.2d at 421 n.10.
345. Id
346. See, e.g., IAN J. BATEMAN ET AL., APPLIED ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: A GIS




utility regulation can exhibit greater creativity, especially as climate change
exerts ever greater pressure on the electrical industry.
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Georgia Board of Equalization34 7 illustrates
the relationship between valuation standards in regulation and taxation. In CSX,
an appraiser "used three different valuation techniques the discounted cash-
flow approach, a market multiple approach, and a stock and debt approach"-to
derive estimates for railroad property "ranging from $8.126 billion to $12.346
billion." 348  These three approaches correspond to Bluefield's attracting
investment and comparable earnings standards and to the contemporary
synthesis of these standards within the CAPM.
CSX hinged not on the validity of these methods, but on their application.
The appraiser "subtract[ed] . . . $400 million" from $8.126 billion "to account
for intangible property not subject to ad valorem taxation" and thereby "settled
on $7.8 billion as his final estimate."349 Despite agreeing in principle with the
state's valuation methodology,350 the railroad valued its taxable property at $6
billion.351' Acknowledging "the variation in the state appraiser's market value
range," to say nothing of the railroad's competing estimate, the Supreme Court
reasoned that "individual [valuation] methods yield sometimes more, sometimes
less reliable results" and "can produce substantially different estimates. "352
In regulation as in taxation, the "admittedly complex" task of valuation "is
at bottom just 'an issue of fact about possible market prices. "353 Courts
"routinely" make "determinations of market value," even "without the benefit of
a market transaction." 354 Far from being a mechanical "matter of mathematics,"
easily reviewed by "simply . .. doublechecking . .. equations," calculating "true
market value is an applied science, even a craft." 355 "To make a fetish of mere
accounting is to shield from examination the deeper causes, forces, movements,
and conditions which should govern rates."356
in Real Estate Appraisal Property Risk Scoring, 23 J. PROP. INV. & FIN. 254 (2005); Marcos Pereira Estellita
Lins et al., Real Estate Appraisal: A Double Perspective Data Envelopment Analysis Approach, 138 ANNALS
OPERATIONS RES. 79 (2005); Robert Peterson & Kevin Boyle, Out of Sight, Out of Mind? Using GIS to
Incorporate Visibility in Hedonic Property Value Models, 78 LAND ECON. 417 (2002).
347. 552 U.S. 9 (2007).
348. Id at 17.
349. Id
350. See id. at 14 n.4; CSX Transp., Inc. v. State Bd. ofEqualization, 472 U.S. 1281,1283-
84 (11th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 552 U.S. 9 (2007); cf Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S.
454, 459 (1987) (recognizing that "almost all jurisdictions which apply property taxes to railroads" use a
"similar procedure for determining the value of railroad property subject to tax").
351. CSX, 552 U.S. at 15.
352. Id at 17.
353. Id at 19 (quoting Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 741
(1997)).
354. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 742; accord CSX, 552 U.S. at 19.
355. CSX, 552 U.S. at 16-17.
356. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 643 n.40 (1944) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
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Thoughtful comparison of all ratemaking methods prudent investment,
DCF, comparable earnings, and the CAPM reveals critical differences along
two dimensions. One dimension is temporal, running from the determinate (if
imperfectly recorded or reported) past to an intrinsically uncertain future. Among
standards for determining a utility's rate of return, the prudent investment
standard alone connects future return to past expenditures. The Gordon growth
model demonstrates how DCF analysis can be conducted on the basis of past
dividends. But Bluefield's directive that regulators set return so as to "attract
investment" spins the temporal arrow toward the future. As securities law warns,
past performance is no guarantor of future performance, and future rather than
past cash flow dictates stock prices.
The other dimension is economically spatial. The spatial boundary among
rate-of-return methodologies falls along a different divide. The prudent
investment and DCF methodologies are firm-specific insofar as they rely on
economic performance unique to the regulated firm. The value of the comparable
earnings standard lies in its directive that regulators look beyond the firm.
Industry-wide information, so pivotal in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,357
represented a logical step toward the consideration of firm-specific, industry-
specific, and market-wide information in ratemaking methodologies based on
the CAPM.
Temporal and spatial differences in ratemaking methodologies will
profoundly affect the pricing of future utility infrastructure under uncertainty. At
this stage in the development of low- and zero-carbon electrical generation,
regulators have a very limited set of antecedents. If regulation, like economics
itself, is a system for conveying information through prices, then retrospective
and firm-specific methodologies offer an initial but ultimately illusory
advantage. Prudent investment or DCF analysis based on historical dividend
information is almost surely more readily discovered, and with greater
confidence, than inquiries into the regulated industry, capital markets, or
macroeconomic conditions.
Trouble arises, however, upon the realization that all sources of uncertainty
related to low- or zero-carbon electrical infrastructure-changes in climate,
energy technologies, the nature of demand for electricity, and the law itself are
forward-looking. Only by striking a prospective perspective and expanding
inquiry past firm-specific factors can regulators accurately forecast demand for
electricity, its cost drivers, and the willingness of investors to shoulder complex
sources of risk. Regulators have no choice but to climb the conceptual
progression from forward-looking DCF analysis (using sophisticated variants of
the Gordon growth model) to industry-wide or market-wide methodologies
exploiting comparable earnings and CAPM data.
The bias against retrospective, firm-specific methodologies and in favor of
prospective, spatially broader methodologies arose during Hope Natural Gas,




the decision rightfully regarded as the genesis of contemporary regulation.
Justice Robert Jackson, lauded for "analyz[ing] with particularity the economic
and social aspects of natural gas as well as the difficulties which led to the
enactment of the Natural Gas Act,"35 8 warned against unthinking endorsement
of prudent investment methodology. Although "prudent investment' may boast
"relative merits for a utility which creates its service merely by its investment,"
that theory "has no rational application where there is no such relation between
investment and capacity to serve."359
Justice Jackson's criticism supplies a standing admonition against
backward-looking regulatory pricing. In forecasting demand for a utility service
and the price at which investors will support entry, as with all forward-looking
judgments, "there is little more relation between [past] investment and the results
than in a game of poker." 360 Value is measured by what consumers will pay for
the output of a business, "not by what [its owner] puts into it." 36 1
Ratemaking amid technological turmoil and existential environmental
angst reflects the challenge of investing as a speculative undertaking. All signals
combine value and noise. s = v + e. Variability in all signals combines expected
dispersion with utterly unpredictable uncertainty: var(s) = var(v) + var(e). To
match their decisions to market-based judgments of firm value, regulators must
abandon their preference for retrospective, firm-specific information and
embrace the inescapable uncertainty of evaluating forward-looking,
comprehensive economic information.
In an metaphor befitting the tumultuous Anthropocene epoch, the law of
regulated industries must now confront its own no-analog future.362 All legal
doctrines, from fair value in Smyth to the CAPM, remain extant. But
environmental, economic, and technological conditions have reshuffled legal
principles to such an extent that regulators must manage new circumstances with
old tools, but no historical guidance.
Finer points of mathematical finance and constitutional doctrine ultimately
yield to practical considerations. "It is not theory . . . which counts," after all,
"but the impact of the rate order." 363 Administrative consistency matters as much
as intellectual cogency.364 "An important factor in the cost of capital ... is
investor uncertainty regarding future company or regulatory action that affects
the components of total return on equity."365 Because liberalized electricity
358. Hope Nat. Gas, 320 U.S. at 624-25 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
359. Id at 649 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
360. Id
361. Id
362. See Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future, 316 SCIENCE 824 (2007); J.B. Ruhl,
Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1 (2008).
363. Hope Nat. Gas, 320 U.S. at 602.
364. Cf Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("[lt is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.").
365. Gelhaus & Wilson, supra note 202, at 295 (emphasis added).
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markets are prone to "some periods of high prices and greater differentiation
between the prices paid by industrial customers ... and [by] residential
customers," this industry faces an elevated risk of political intervention.366
Unless capital markets have a clear understanding of regulatory "methods
to be employed in calculating total return, this uncertainty becomes an additional
risk" factor that will "increase[e] the minimal return that [an investor]
demands." 367 Although changes in the physical environment and the arc of
technological progress may lie beyond the law, minimizing regulatory
uncertainty benefits consumers and the allocation of resources generally. 36 8
Legal consistency should bar either firms or their regulators from shifting
arbitrarily between ratemaking methodologies. 369 Such "an exciting new twist'
in regulation "invites an enormous amount of gamesmanship."37 0 Wholly apart
from private firms' motivation to exploit ratemaking rules, regulators face their
own behavioral temptation. The asymmetry of regulatory risk may lure agencies
into "arbitrarily switch[ing] back and forth between methodologies in a way
which require[s] investors to bear the risk of bad investments at some times while
denying them the benefit of good investments at others."37 '
Ratemaking formulas, whether couched in the logic of prudent investment,
DCF, or asset pricing, fall short of offering comprehensive risk management.
Even the most elaborate quantitative efforts to "give[] probabilities" for "various
outcomes" make "no attempt to explain [the] underlying structure [of] price
changes." 372 Neither regulation nor finance can fully rebut Roll's first critique,
the objection that portfolio theory tautologically restates the capital asset pricing
model, insofar as any mean-variance efficient portfolio is mathematically
equivalent to the CAPM's expected return.373
366. David B. Spence, The Politics ofElectricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 447 (2005); cf Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate
Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801 (2012)
(identifying potential conflicts among federal, state, and regional authorities over the connection of renewable
energy sources to the transmission grid).
367. Gelhaus & Wilson, supra note 202, at 295.
368. Id.
369. Cf Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29,48 (1983) ("[A]n agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner
370. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 74 F.2d 1486,1525 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
371. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 315 (1989). But see Verizon
Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 526 (2002) (failing to identify constitutionally significant "reliance
interests" that would be "jeopardized by an intentional switch in rate-setting methodologies").
372. DOUGLAS W. HUBBARD, THE FAILURE OF RISK MANAGEMENT 67 (2009). But cf
DOUGLAS W. HUBBARD, HOW TO MEASURE ANYTHING: FINDING THE VALUE OF INTANGIBLES IN
BUSINESS (2007) (using portfolio theory to value anything used in business).
373. See Richard Roll, A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests-PartI: On Past
and Potential Testability ofthe Theory, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 129, 136 (1977); see also Fama & MacBeth, supra




Tautologies such as r = D1 /P0 + g, however, do serve useful purposes.
What matters is that the tautology be "correct."3 74 "All models are wrong; some
models are useful." 375
DCF and the Gordon growth model epitomize the quest for a rate of return
that attracts investment. The CAPM culminates nearly a century of regulatory
wisdom garnered while "muddling through" the comparable earnings
standard.376 Both of Bluefield's ratemaking standardS377 may be understood in
terms of section II.B.1's general model of financial uncertainty.
DCF, the Gordon growth model, and the CAPM are all special cases of the
formula, s = v + e, which denotes an economic signal (s) as the sum of
fundamental value (v) and noise (e). The basic DCF formula, , defines the rate
of return as the ratio of dividends to share price, plus a less determinate growth
factor. Rejecting the unrealistic assumption that investors "live for only one
period" connects DCF and the Gordon growth model with more sophisticated
models. 378 Investment-based asset pricing defines the rate of return as a function
of corporate earnings and stock returns.379 Conceptually, the rate of return should
equal the ratio of a vector of future earnings from which a corporation pays
dividends to the corresponding vector of capital investments:
e e1 e2 *** en-1n
k k 0 k ... kn- 2 kn-1
This ratio amalgamates prudent investment with the basic ratio of earnings
to price.
The regulatory CAPM, ru = rf + lu(r - rf), likewise fits the basic
s = v + e formula. The second half of this formula, fuu(r, - rf) may be
374. Leventhal, supra note 187, at 1009 n.72.
375. G.E.P. Box, J. STUART HUNTER & WILLIAM G. HUNTER, STATISTICS FOR
EXPERIMENTERS: DESIGN, INNOVATION, AND DISCOVERY 440 (2d ed. 2005); see also id. at 208, 384;
G.E.P. Box & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING AND RESPONSE SURFACES 74 (1987)
("Remember that all models are wrong; the practical question is how wrong do they have to be to not be
useful."); id. at 424 ("Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.").
376. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through", 19 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 79, 86 (1959); cf Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 733
(1969) (recommending that agencies accumulate information about regulated industries and follow a
"common law" policymaking approach).
377. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679, 692-93 (1923).
378. Jagannathan & Wang, supra note 316, at 4; see Robert C. Merton, An
Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model, 41 ECONOMETRICA 867 (1973); John Y. Campbell,
Intertemporal Asset Pricing Without Consumption Data, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 487 (1993); Eugene F.
Fama, Multifactor Portfolio Efficiency and Multifactor Asset Pricing, 31 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 44
(1996).
379. See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, Production-BasedAsset Pricing and the Link Between
Stock Returns and Economic Fluctuations, 46 J. FIN. 209 (1991); Laura Xiaolei Liu et al., Investment-
Based Expected Stock Returns, 117 J. POL. ECON. 1105 (2009). This approach should be contrasted with
consumption-based asset pricing. See, e.g., John Y. Campbell & John H. Cochrane, By Force ofHabit: A
Consumption-Based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior, 107 J. POL. ECON. 205 (1999).
Risk premiums unique to utility companies may be reflect macroeconomic pro-cyclicality between
demand for utility services and returns on human capital.
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conceptualized as the premium that induces investors to buy utility stock instead
of a risk-free Treasury bond. We can express this idea, without loss of generality,
through econophysics: If "[t]he optimal portfolio is ... given by minimizing the
risk o, given the return -," then "risk o is a quadratic function of the deviation
of the portfolio return from that of the riskless asset, (r - ro)2 .380
The inclusion of industry-specific beta within the regulatory CAPM
provides a further illustration of generalized economic uncertainty. As a measure
of variance within the economic signal that communicates a utility's intrinsic
value, beta decomposes into a basic quantum of risk, plus a premium indicating
the reliability of the information used to compute beta: var(s) = var(v) + var(e).
Most regulatory applications treat beta as if it were unconditionally reliable.
Conceptualizing beta as a special case of information uncertainty, Etre,t+i -
yVt + OMt lets us define and quantify the "higher premium" that investors
demand under uncertainty.38' If we have confidence in our methods for
quantifying risk, "so that M = 0, or if agents are not averse to uncertainty, so that
o = 0,",382 the more familiar linear regression expressing returns over a risk-free
baseline, Etret+i = yVt, within the CAPM is recovered as a special case of
Etret+i = yVt + OMt, the formula combining aversion to risk with aversion to
uncertainty.383 In mathematical as well as metaphorical terms, rate regulation
must "wager [its] salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect
knowledge."3 84
380. PETER RICHMOND ET AL., ECONOPHYSICS AND PHYSICAL ECONOMICS § 11.2, at
118 (2013).
381. Anderson et al., supra note 96, at 234.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 233-34.
384. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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